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CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS:
A LURKING NIGHTMARE?
INTRODUCTION
Litigation against public accountants has vastly
increased during the past decade. I Although most
suits have been civil actions, 2 several recent federal
criminal actions involving public accountants may
well have the greatest impact upon the profession. In
sharp contrast to earlier criminal suits, the cases now
involve the largest, most sophisticated international
accounting firms. Moreover, the resulting sanctions
for those accountants found guilty are no longer
limited to fines and probable loss of professional
credentials; in December 1974, a partner and a staff
member of a large international firm received both
jail sentences and fines for their involvement in
securities fraud. 'The threat of such stiff penalties for
improper accounting activity may have profound
implications upon the role of public accountants in
the future.
Criminal cases involving accountants generally
evolve from Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) investigations into allegedly fraudulent
schemes. This occurs even though the Commission
cannot directly commence a criminal proceeding, but
can only refer the matter to the Department of Jus-
tice for prosecution.' Factors generally considered
'A 1973 count showed that more than 500 companies
have litigation or claims against accountants. See Arthur
Andersen & Co. Ann. Rep. 4 (Mar. 31, 1973).
2Public accountants' problems with civil liability have
received much review. See generally S. Kurland, Account-
ants' Legal Liability: Ultramares to BarChris, 25 Bus.
LAW. 155 (1969); Marinelli, The Expanding Scope of
Accountants' Liability to Third Parties, 23 CASE W. Ras.
L. RE. 113 (1971); Comment, Two Cases Dealing with
CPA's Legal Liability-Analysis: Recommendations, 10
AMt. Bus. L.J. 83 (1972); Comment, Auditors'Responsibil-
ity for Misrepresentation: Inadequate Protection for Users
of Financial Statements, 44 WASH. L. REV. 139 (1968);
Note, Accountants' Liabilities for False and Misleading
Financial Statements, 67 CoLu ,i. L. REv. 1437 (1967).
'United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3592 (U.S., Apr. 19, 1976)
(No. 75-808). See also Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1974, at 10,
col. 1.
4 Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)
important in the SEC's recommendation for prose-
cution include whether the prospective defendants
are chronic violators in fraudulent promotions and
whether the case involves a "particularly egregious,
or currently 'fashionable' promotional scheme." 5
These factors, however, are usually not so important
when the prosecution involves accountants; rather,
the government's implicit attitude is that because
accountants are really financial "experts," they may
"prevent many questionable activities before they
occur," 6 and if extremely derelict in their duty, they
should face criminal sanctions. Additionally, in-
creased federal prosecution against accountants re-
suits from the notoriety and impact of widespread
national financial scandals.
Expanding exposure to criminal liability has
aroused the accounting profession's ire. The recent
conviction of two members of a large firm7 evoked
strong public reaction from the firm's senior partner:
We are shocked at the verdict and will fully support
[the defendants] in their appeal .... We believe the
jury didn't understand the complicated accounting
and disclosure questions in the case.... I
This anger within the profession stems primarily
from a feeling that courts, basking in the luxury of
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act]; Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Exchange Act].
'Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal
Securities Laws and Related Statutes: The Nature and
Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 901, 916 (1971).
6 Burton, SEC Enforcement and Professional Account-
ants: Philosophy, Objectives, and Approach, 28 VAND. L.
REV. 19, 20 (1975).
'United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3592 (U.S., Apr. 19, 1976) (No.
75-808).
'Statement of Walter E. Hanson, December 14, 1974 in
Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1974 at 10, col. 1. On appeal to the
Second Circuit these auditors were aided by amicus curiae
briefs from their accounting firm and the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants.
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hindsight, misunderstand the public auditor's role
in the business community. Accountants, long used
to operating in relation to "generally accepted audit-
ing standards" and "generally accepted accounting
principles," " believe that courts, juries, and prose-
cutors do not understand how these rules and proce-
dures guide the profession. Hence, some accountants
believe that their guilt or innocence is determined in
complete disregard of these professional. standards.
Furthermore, accountants argue that their involve-
ment with any fraudulent scheme should be judged
by a more relaxed standard because in most cases the
auditor does not share in the fraud's financial
spoils. " Finally, accountants feel that besides being
at odds with professional thinking, court-evolved
standards for determining criminal responsibility are
vague, and thus leave the man-in-the-field with little
guidance on how to avoid criminal liability.
Certainly the heightened specter of criminal sanc-
tions makes the accounting profession wary. A guilty
verdict, besides resulting in a fine and/or imprison-
ment, almost always leads to a revocation of the CPA
certificate and license to practice. " Unlike the civil
liability risk, criminal responsibility is not insurable.,
It is also arguable that criminal charges against a
firm's personnel create more unfavorable publicity
than civil suits. Because of these and other concerns,
this comment will describe the modern public ac-
countant's role, review the statutory sources of
potential criminal sanctions, examine developing
case law, and analyze whether adherenceto profes-
sional accounting standards is relevant when a
federal criminal action is brought against an account-
ant.
THE PUBLIC AUDITOR'S FUNCTION
Public accountants are in the financial information
business. Although accounting firms provide many
different services, "2 the core of a firm's business is
9These technical accounting terms are more fully dis-
cussed at text accompanying notes 17-31 infra.
10 But see United States v. Zane, 495 F.2d 683 "(2d Cir.),
motion for new trial denied, 507 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1975), cert. denied as to motion
for new trial, 421 U.S. 910 (1975), in which two CPA's
agreed to certify the existence of a falsely procured certifi-
cate of deposit in exchange for a substantial increase in the
audit fee.
"For example, in Illinois the Department of Registra-
tion may cancel or suspend a public accountant's license for
being convicted of a felony or being convicted for any crime
which involves fraud or dishonesty as an essential element.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 '/2, § 44 (1973). See, e.g. CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 5100 (West 1974); N. Y. EDUC. LAw §§
6509, 6511 (McKinney 1972).
12 Ordinarily an accounting firm's primary responsibili-
ties are grouped under the subject headings of auditing, tax,
usually auditing, and it is this attesting function
which has spawned virtually all of the litigation fac-
ing accountants. "
Auditing is the process through which independent
persons examine financial statements with a view
toward expressing an opinion on whether those
statements fairly reflect and present the substance of
a company's economic transactions. " As one audit-
ing textbook explains, auditing is
the examination of information by a third party other
than the preparer or user, with the intent of establish-
ing its reliability, and the reporting of the results of
this examination with the expectation of increasing the
usefulness of the information to the user. 15
In theory, the independent auditor's report may
prove very useful to financial statement users. 16
When performing an audit, the public accountant
must observe "generally accepted auditing stan-
dards" (GAAS). 1 7 Divided into general standards,'"
fieldwork standards,' 9 and standards of reporting,2"
and management services.3This analysis does not consider criminal tax evasion
charges against an accountant. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
7206.
"See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC Ac-
COUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 1
§ 110.01 (1973) [hereinafter SAS No. 1].
1"W. T. PORTER, JR. & J. BURTON, AUDITING: A
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 5 (1971).
1Id. at 4-5.
"Technically, "generally accepted auditing standards"
(GAAS) only apply to accountants who are members of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accounts. SAS No.
1, supra note 14, § 150.02. However, as a practical matter,
GAAS are used by state licensing boards in setting appro-
priate standards for accounting work.
"The general standards are:
(1) The examination is to be performed by a person or
persons having adequate technical training and profi-
ciency as an auditor; (2) In all matters relating to the
assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to
be maintained by the auditor or auditors; (3) Due
professional care is to be exercised in the performance
of the examination and the preparation of the report.
SAS No. 1, supra note 14, § 150.02.
"The standards of fieldwork are:
(1) The work is to be adequately planned and
assistants, if any, are to be properly supervised; (2)
There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the
existing internal control as a basis for reliance thereon
and for the determination of the resultant extent of the
tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted;
(3) Sufficient competent evidential matter is to -be
obtained through inspection, observation, inquiries,
and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for an
opinion regarding the financial statement under exam-
ination.
SAS No. 1, supra note 14, § 150.02.
2 The standards of reporting are:
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these rules assure that a competent, independent
examiner will adequately analyze the client's infor-
mation system and resulting financial statements,
gathering sufficient evidence to render an opinion.
The auditor's report of opinion is an investiga-
tion's primary end-product, capturing investor atten-
tion and usually furnishing the starting point for any
litigation against the auditor. A rather standardized
manner of presenting this report has developed so
that variations will readily appear. 1 Ordinarily the
report's opening or "scope" paragraph tells what the
auditor did or did not do in the examination." After
reciting the investigation's scope, the auditor then
moves to the "opinion" paragraph. This opinion
must be either unqualified (often called a "clean"
opinion),' 3 adverse,' 4 qualified, 25 or a statement
disclaiming any opinion. 2Obviously, an unqualified
opinion is desired because it carries the auditor's
strongest assurance that the financial statements
fairly present the underlying economic transactions
in conformity with "generally accepted accounting
principles" (GAAP)."
In conducting an audit and determining the
fairness of financial statement presentation, the
auditor works within the framework of GAAP.
(1) The report shall state whether the financial
statements are presented in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles; (2) The report shall
state whether such principles have been consistently
applied in the current period in relation to the pre-
ceding period; (3) Informative disclosures in the fi-
nancial statements are to be regarded as reasonably
adequate unless otherwise stated in the report; (4) The
report shall either contain an expression of opinion
regarding the financial statements, taken as a whole,
or an assertion to the effect that an opinion cannot be
expressed. When an overall opinion cannot be ex-
pressed, the reasons therefore should be stated. Ii all
cases where an auditor's name is associated with
financial statements, the report shall contain a clear-
cut indication of the character of the auditor's exami-
nation, if any, and the degree of responsibility he is
taking.
SAS No. 1, supra note 14, § 150.02.
31 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNT-
ANTS, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 2 §§ 6, 7
(1974) [hereinafter cited as SAS No. 2].
22Id. 99 9 & 10. If the auditor's examination were
somehow limited such that it might have influenced his




26 1d. §§ 45-47.
2Under the reporting standards, an audit report must
state whether the financial statements are presented in
accordance with GAAP, consistently applied. See note 20
supra.
There is no precisely determined codification for
GAAP: "
The phrase "generally accepted accounting princi-
ples" is a technical accounting term which encompas-
ses the conventions, rules, and procedures necessary to
define accepted accounting practice at a particular
time."'
Thus GAAP furnish a "uniform standard" for
evaluating financial statement presentation, 0 and
"recognize the importance of recording transactions
in accordance with their substance,"'" with appro-
priate disclosure.
SOURCES OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
Federal criminal actions against public account-
ants typically arise from the criminal provisions of
the Securities Act of 193332 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. " Additionally, the government
may utilize the Mail Fraud Act, 4 the Conspiracy
Act (Offenses Against U.S.), " or the federal false
statements statute. 36
Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act prohibits willful
violation of any SEC rule or regulation or willfully
and knowingly making a false statement in any filing
sent to the Commission. 7 Auditors are exposed to
this proviso because the audit report accompanies
"
8 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNT-
ANTS, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 5 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as SAS No. 51 notes:
Generally accepted accounting principles are relatively
objective; that is, they are sufficiently established so
that independent auditors usually agree on their
existence. Nevertheless, the identification of an ac-
counting principle as generally accepted in particular
circumstances requires judgment. No single source of
reference exists for all established accounting princi-
ples.
Id. § 5.
"I1d. §2. For a more extensive analysis of GAAP see
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS,
STATEMENT OF THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD No. 4
§§ 27-31 (1970).
"°SAS No. 5, supra note 28, § 3.
3
1Id. § 7.
"Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970).
3 Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1970).
3418 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
3518 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
3618 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970).
"Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970)
provides:
(a) Any person who willfully violates any provision of
this chapter, or any rule or regulation thereunder the
violation of which is made unlawful or the observance
of which is required under the terms of this chapter, or
any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or
causes to be made, any statement in any application,
report, or document required to be filed under this
chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder or any
undertaking contained in a registration statement as
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ACCOUNTANTS' CRIMINAL LIABILITY
SEC filings3 8 and is considered a "statement" within
section 32(a)'s meaning. If the audit opinion is
untrue or misleading with respect to any material
fact, then it is a "false statement" subjecting the
certifying auditor to criminal sanction. Punishment
under section 32(a) can be a fine and/or imprison-
ment. 9
Section 24 of the Securities Act provides for
criminal penalties if there is a willful violation of any
of the Act's provisions or if a person participating in
a registration statement willfully makes an untrue
statement of a material fact. "0 Since a public account-
ant's report must accompany registration state-
ments, 4 ' a false or misleading auditor's report sent
along with the registration would violate the provi-
sion. Furthermore, if the resulting prospectus is
mailed to potential investors while including the false
report, there might be a concurrent mail fraud
violation. Section 24's use, however, is limited to new
offerings; consequently, it has not been used as
frequently as section 32(a) of the Exchange Act.
Although not specifically formulated in response to
securities fraud, the Mail Fraud Act4 2 has been
provided in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title,
which statement was false or misleading with respect
to any material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both, except that when such person is an
exchange, a fine not exceeding $500,000 may be
imposed; but no person shall be subject to imprison-
ment under this section for the violation of any rule or
regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of
such rule or regulation. (emphasis added)
3 For example, an independent public accountant's
report of examination must accompany annual 10-K filings
sent to the Commission. Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. §
78m(a) (1970).
'9 Either a fine or imprisonment are available penalties,
except that if a defendant proves that he had no knowledge
of the regulation or rule, he will not be imprisoned.
"Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970) pro-
vides:
Any person who willfully violates any of the pro-
visions of this subchapter, or the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission under authority
thereof, or any person who willfully, in a registration
statement filed under this subchapter, makes any
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state
any material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not mislead-
ing, shall upon conviction be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
"Securities Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1970) and Se-
curities Act Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970).
4218 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money
or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
used several times against accountants . 43 Basically,
the provision precludes the use of the mails in
furtherance of a scheme or artifice to defraud. Since
each separate mailing may be viewed as an independ-
ent offense, its power as a criminal charge is vast. 44 If
an accountant certifies or prepares financial state-
ments, eventually mailed, that he knows or should
have known to be false, he may be criminally
responsible under this Act. 5
The federal false statements statute' 6 can also
be used in a criminal suit against an accountant. It
prohibits making a knowing or willful false state-
ment to any federal government department or
agency. Ordinarily the auditor's exposure will be
limited to statements in the audit report, since both
the accounting profession and the SEC agree that
financial statements are, in most cases, manage-
ment representations. 47 Despite its applicability, the
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of,
loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or
furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or
spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or
anything represented to be or intimated or held out to
be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose
of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to
do, places in any post office or authorized depository
for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or
receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to
the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is
addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
'"United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970); United States v.
Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
953 (1964).
" Milam v. United States, 322 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1963);
United States v. Interstate Engineering, 288 F. Supp. 402
(D.N.H. 1967). If the auditor mails his client a fraudulent
financial statement and the client in turn mails the final
reports to others, two offenses would have been committed.
4"Note, Federal Criminal and Administrative Controls
for Auditors: The Need for a Consistent Standard, 1969
WASH. U. L. Q. 187, 200.
46"g U.S.C. § 1001 (1970) provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of
any department or agency of the United States know-
ingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by
any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes
any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or repre-
sentations, or makes or uses any false writing or docu-
ment knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious
or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
4'The SEC's position was enunciated early in the
Commission's life. Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., 4 S.E.C.
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section has not been frequently used. This may result
because section 32(a) of the Exchange Act and
section 24 of the Securities Act encompass the alleged
criminal activity more directly; however, the false
statements act is potentially helpful when the audi-
tor's report accompanies financial statements going
to other governmental agencies besides the SEC.
Federal prosecutors may also utilize the Con-
spiracy Act 4" in suits against accountants. It is a
useful prosecutorial tool because, even though the
specific requirements of another criminal proviso are
not met, the conspiratorial efforts nonetheless consti-
tute a substantive. offense. Moreover, a conspiracy
charge can easily bootstrap upon the facts of another
criminal charge and perhaps reinforce it, yet remain
independent."'
All of these federal criminal provisions require
either some form of "willful" " violation or an
"intent to defraud."" 1 Mere negligence will not
706, 721 (1939); Breeze Corp., 3 S.E.C. 708, 729 (1938).
The accounting profession's belief that financial state-
ments are primarily management representations is codi-
fied in SAS No. 1, supra note 14, § 110.02.
Of course, if the auditor actually prepared false financial
statements rather than just examined them, 'then those
representations would properly be attributable to him, and
if submitted to a government agency, would expose him to
section 1001's liability. See Note, Federal Criminal and
Administratwe Cohtrols for Auditors: The Need for a
Consistent Standard, 1969 WASH. U. L. Q. 187, 194.
4818 U.S.C. § 371 (1970) provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit
any offense against the United States, or to defraud
the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner
or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall
be fined not more than S10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is
the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the
punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the
maximum punishment provided for such misdemean-
or.
4 9The independence of a conspiracy charge from another
criminal offense is illustrated in United States v. Zane, 495
F.2d 683 (2d Cir.), motion for new trial denied, 507 F.2d
346 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895, cert. denied
as to motion for new trial, 421 U.S. 910 (1975). Two
CPA's were accused of, inter alia, conspiring to file a false
annual form 10-K and with violating section 32(a) of the
Exchange Act for filing that false report with the Com-
mission. They were acquitted in a jury trial on the con-
spiracy charge but found guilty for submitting a false re-
port to the Commission. The Second Circuit refused to find
error in this result.
"
0 The criminal provisions of the Exchange Act and the
Securities Act, as well as the false statements act, contain
such language.
"
1The mail fraud statute specifically contains this lan-
guage. While not explicitly expressed in the federal conspir-
activate these sections."' Viewed from the profes-
sional accountant's perspective, the most important
consideration to be determined is the time at which
his conduct becomes willful and knowing instead of
grossly negligent. A corollary issue is to what extent
adherence to professional standards is, or should be,
an appropriate defense to such criminal charges. It is
on these questions that the tension between the couris
and the accounting profession surfaces.
CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
Even though federal criminal action against ac-
countants is receiving increased attention within the
financial community, there have only been a small
number of such cases. Perhaps this explains some of
the impact that seems to result when these situations
arise. Nevertheless, despite the handful of cases,
some important concepts have developed.
Apparently the earliest case, United States v.
White 3 involved a certified public accountant,
White, who was charged with mail fraud for prepar-
ing false financial statements that were later part of a
prospectus mailed to investors. White claimed that
he merely took the data from the corporation's books
and believed that the figures were true. The govern-
ment pointed out the following "irregularities" in
the figures White compiled: an asset purchased for
25 per cent of its face value was recorded as being
worth 87.5 per cent of its face value; " normal
operating expenses were capitalized as promotion
costs to avoid showing a loss; promissory notes that
were virtually uncollectible were substantially writ-
ten up in value, thus suggesting that the company
earned income; and irregular and unexplained with-
drawals by the company's president which the court
termed "thefts" 5 were conveniently disguised as
capital deductions.
The government did not, however, show that
White actually knew of the falsity in the corpora-
acy statute, judicial interpretation supplies this element.
See, e.g., Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672 (1959);
Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359 (1912); Daniel-
son v. United States, 321 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1963); United
States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
2For an analysis of the state of mind and mens rea
problems which arise when federal criminal charges are
brought against accountants see Note, Federal Criminal
Controls and Administrative Controls for Auditors: The
Need for a Consistent Standard, 1969 WAsH. U. L. Q. 187,
189-218.
"3124 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1941).
4 The court noted that " ... White was a very
credulous accountant if he believed that accounts bought
for only a quarter of their face really had a value of seven-




tion's records or of anything told to him. Rather, the
case rested upon the inference that an accountant of
White's experience could not let such blatant irregu-
larities pass without becoming aware of the underly-
ing fraud. Reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
Judge Learned Hand wrote:
It is true that all these instances, taken singly, do not
prove beyond question that White knew that the
statements which he prepared were padded with false
entries; but logically the sum is often greater than the
aggregate of the parts, and the cumulation of instances,
each explicable only by extreme credulity or profes-
sional inexpertness, may have a probative force im-
mensely greater than any one of them alone."
Thus, under the White approach, the entire set of
facts and circumstances surrounding an accountant's
relationship can be used to establish an inference of
guilt. Underlying this view is the recognition that a
public accountant, with acknowledged expertise in
financial matters, is sensitive to the existence of fraud
or extreme irregularity, and "may not blind himself to
the economic realities of the situation.
Such judicial feeling was amplified in United
States v. Benjamin. 57 Howard, a certified public
accountant, was engaged to review financial state-
ments and to attest to the client's purported net
worth. His first report falsely claimed that certain
auditing work was performed and that certain assets
existe,4, when in fact no examination or verification
procedures were employed .5 This was a clear
departure from generally accepted auditing stan-
dards. Later Howard was sent to investigate a
potential acquisition; during this trip Howard's
room service and telephone were cut off by the hote!
because his client not only could not pay the bill but
also refused to make a $200 advance to him.
Nevertheless, Howard thereafter issued a report
"extolling the prospects of this $8,700,000
company." 59 While reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence for violating the Securities Act, 60 and citing
Judge Hand's statements in White, the court said:
[Tihe Government can meet its burden by proving
561d.




"Howard was convicted of conspiring to willfully
violate §§ 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77(e)(a), 77(e)(c), and 77q(a) (1964). Criminal
sanctions for violations of these provisions are presently
implemented via § 24 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77x
(1970).
that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to facts
he had a duty to see,... or recklessly stated as facts
things of which he was ignorant. 61
The court, recognizing the extreme importance that
an accountant's certificate can mean to investors
6 2
and realizing that negligence would not suffice to
support a criminal action stated:
But Congress equally could not have intended that
men holding themselves out as members of these
ancient professions should be able to escape criminal
liability on a plea of ignorance when they have shut
their eyes to what was plainly to be seen or have
represented a knowledge they knew they did not
possess. 63
Benjamin thus more fully articulates the rule that
reckless disregard for the truth of financial state-
ments may be sufficient to permit imposition of
criminal sanctions against public accountants.
Neither White nor Benjamin discussed whether
compliance with professional accounting standards
(GAAP and GAAS) would provide an auditor with a
defense to criminal charges. Arguably, both cases
reflected a broad departure from customary and
accepted accounting practices. Yet because the audi-
tors' conduct seemed so deficient and the surrounding
circumstances so blatantly fraudulent, the issue was
not raised. Furthermore, the auditor's actions in
either case distorted and misrepresented several ,iems
in the financial statements. This rather gross distor-
tion stands in contrast to several subsequent criminal
cases involving accountants where the presentation in
the financial statements of one or perhaps two items
comprised the basis of the federal criminal
allegation . 6 ' Thus, White and Benjamin at least
furnish some minimum standards, providing that
wholesale fabrication of financial statements or in-
tentionally false audit reports may constitute crimi-
nal activity. 6' Neither opinion has aroused any
61 328 F.2d at 862 (citations omitted).
621d. at 863.
63Id.
"E.g., United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3592 (U.S., Apr. 19,
1976) (No. 75-808); United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
"See, e.g., United States v. Zane, 495 F.2d 683 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974) (absence of proper
auditing procedures while certifying a bank certificate of
deposit); United States v. Bruce, 488 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1975) (distorted finan-
cial statements in an intrastate securities offering); Get-
chell v. United States, 282 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1960) (alle-
gation that CPA participated in preparing a false invest-
ment brochure extolling the company's virtues; conviction
for mail fraud reversed since there was no evidence that the
19761
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adverse reaction within the accounting profession,
perhaps leading to the inference that these decisions
are consistent with the profession's thinking.
However, a subsequent case, United States v.
Simon, "has generated strong disagreement from the
accounting profession. Three accountants from a
leading international firm were charged and found
guilty of conspiring to prepare and subsequently
certify a false and misleading financial statement."
Specifically, the accountants were said to have
designed a footnote to Continental Vending Machine
Corporation's (Continental) 1962 financial state-
ments which would hide serious looting of Continen-
tal carried out by its president.
The footnote dealt with a circuitous and irregular
method of financing between Continental, its affiliate
Valley Commercial Corporation (Valley), and Roth,
a stockholder, director, and officer in both
companies. 6 First, Continental would borrow funds
from Valley. Second, Valley would borrow from
Continental, in most cases immediately transferring
the proceeds to Roth who used the funds to finance
large margined stock holdings.6 " Continental's bal-
ance sheet thus reflected a receivable from, and
payable to, Valley which could not be netted because
Valley had discounted Continental's notes in order to
secure the funds it loaned back to Continental.
Apparently there was evidence that the auditors
had been aware of this method of financing since
1958, and had observed the steady increase in the
amounts involved without any real inquiry or further
examination. 0 In preparing for the 1962 audit the
defendant-accountant used the mails); United States v.
Olen, 183 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.), petition for mandamus
denied sub nom. United States v. Cashin, 218 F.2d 669 (2d
Cir.,1960). The exact disposition of the criminal charges in
United States v. Olen, supra, is not known, although one of
the defendants eventually submitted his permanent resigna-
tion from SEC practice. In re Kerlin, CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. (S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 105) 72,127 (1966).
6 United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
6 7The three defendants were found guilty of conspiracy
to violate section 32(a) of the Exchange Act, the false
statements act, and mail fraud. All three were fined;
subsequently, they were fully pardoned by President
Nixon. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1973, at 55, col. 1.
" Roth owned approximately 25 per cent of Continental
and of Valley. 425 F.2d at 799.
69This arrangement to siphon out Continental's funds to
Roth took on astounding proportions. Over a six-year
period Valley advanced $13 million to Roth out of a total
borrowing from Continental of more than S16 million. Id.
at n.3.
"s In reviewing the Valley receivable the court noted that
not only did the amounts involved increase, but that usually
there was a paydownjust prior to the end of one fiscal year,
only to rise again in the next period. This tactic would
accountants knew that Continental was extremely
cash poor, 7 a fact that underscored the need for the
S3.5 million Valley receivable to be collectible."2 The
auditors were unable to secure Valley's financial
statements, and, before the date of certification, were
informed that Roth could not repay Valley. Conse-
quently Valley could not repay Continental. This
immediately and seriously undermined Continental's
ability to continue as a viable company.
Facing this extremely critical set of facts, the
auditors agreed that if adequate collateral were
posted," the Valley receivable could be attested to
without examining Valley's books. Roth assigned his
personal assets to collateralize Valley's borrowing;
however, 80 per cent of-this collateral consisted of
Roth's holding in Continental's stock and securities.
Hence, Continental was collateralizing itself. "
The controversial footnote, which was drafted by
the accountants and had been the subject of much
review, merely disclosed that the Valley receivable
had been buttressed with Valley's equity in various
securities. 7" The government, focusing on the audi-
tors' long awareness of this financing and their
consistent failure to inquire into it, felt that they had
written this footnote to preserve their professional
accounting reputation and to avoid acknowledging a
effectively hide the full extent of the borrowing. Id. at 802.
At no point did the auditors ever determine whether these
loans had been approved by Continental's board of direc-
tors.
7 The daily check float was in excess of S500,000. Id.
"By certification date, Valley's borrowings totaled
$3.9 million. Id. at 799.
7"The auditors requested that satisfactory collateral be
posted, a proper legal opinion be obtained, and approval
from Continental's board be secured. Not only were the
assets chosen for collateral quite unsuitable, but the
Continental board disapproved of the loans to Valley.
Nevertheless, an unqualified opinion was rendered. Id. at
803.
"From a financial viewpoint the danger is clear. If the
value of Continental stock and debentures dropped due to
insolvency fears, then the value of the collateral would, in
parallel fashion, decrease. This would act to further
heighten insolvency fears and accelerate the process. Even-
tually this happened when the value of Continental stock
plummeted. Id. at 805.
71The footnote merely recited Valley's "affiliated" rela-
tionship, Roth's dual interests in both firms, the rate of
interest, and the fact that the debt was secured by
marketable securities, currently in excess of the receivable.
Id. at 800. On the other hand, the government argued that
an appropriate footnote, truly reflecting what defendants
knew, would have acknowledged Valley's loan to Roth,
stated that the Valley receivable was currently uncollecti-
ble, and though collateralized, would have disclosed that




previous error ofjudgment. " More importantly, this
non-disclosure really hid the quite serious matter of
Continental's continued existence. 77
In defense, the accountants claimed that their
work was performed in conformity with GAAP,
adequate auditing steps were carried out, and that
there was no duty requiring an auditor to investigate
each loan to an affiliate.7 8 Essentially, the defense
contended that an accountant had to willfully depart
from GAAP, kn6wing the financial statements were
false, in order to face criminal liability.
On appeal, the Second Circuit approved the trial
court's instruction that the "critical test" was
whether Continental's financial statements as a
whole fairly presented its true financial position and
results of operation. " If the financial statements did
not "fairly present" these facts, the inquiry would be
whether the defendants acted in good faith. While
proof of compliance with generally accepted account-
ing practices was a relevant input to the good faith
issue, it was not a controlling factor. " Moreover, the
court noted that the use of GAAP or certain auditing
procedures in any particular circumstance rests on
some basic assumptions and observations: "Once he
[the auditor] has reason to believe that this basic
assumption is false, an entirely different situation
confronts him." ' Here the court felt that Roth's
looting of Continental via the Valley receivable, a
fact known to the accountants, necessitated full and
open disclosure. " Hence, when the auditors failed to
7 Id. at 808.
"Just before the printer's proof of the 1962 financial
statements was ready, the accountants requested payment of
the prior year's audit fee. They were given a check, yet told
that it would "bounce." Id. at 804.
"
8The defendants gathered eight leading accountants to
support their defense. For the most part, these witnesses
supported the defendant's positions. Id. at 805.79Id. at 806.
"
8Id. at 805. The court quoted the trial court's instruc-
tions to the jury concerning the appropriate weight to be
given to proof of compliance with accounting standards:
The weight and credibility to be extended by you to
such proof, and its persuasiveness, must depend,
among other things, on how authoritative you find the
precedents and the teachings relied upon by the parties
to be, the extent to which they contemplate, deal with,
and apply to the type of circumstances found by you to
have existed here, and the weight you give to expert
opinion evidence offered by the parties. Those may
depend on the credibility extended by you to expert
witnesses, the definiteness with which they testified,





state all of these facts, the jury could properly infer a
lack of good faith:
The jury could reasonably have wondered how ac-
countants who were really seeking to tell the truth
could have constructed a footnote so well designed to
conceal the shocking facts. 
83
When the Simon court called for "fair presenta-
tion" what it really meant was "honest presenta-
tion." The core of the case against the auditors was
that they certified a financial statement which they
knew did not truthfully reflect Continental's eco-
nomic health because critical facts were not disclosed.
Not being an honest presentation, it was irrelevant
that the auditors did not personally profit from the
fraudulent activity8 4 and that all had been "men of
blameless lives and respected members of a learned
profession." " In this context, honesty does not turn
on evil intent or bad motive in creating misleading
financial statements, but refers to the total presenta-
tion which financial statements convey.
After Simon, there was widespread feeling within
the accounting profession that the case completely
swept aside the relevance of adherence to professional
standards in assessing criminal liability. 8 6 The court,
however, did not go that far. Rather it implied that if
professional standards permitted the accountants to
escape disclosing what they knew, then adherence to
professional standards was not sufficient.
It might have been possible for the Simon court to
have used GAAS as a measure in evaluating the
accountants' conduct and thus sidestep the adverse
reaction. Arguably, GAAS were not fully applied
during the Continental audit. This incomplete effort
affected all three subgroups of GAAS; neither the
general, fieldwork, nor reporting standards were
properly applied.'
Starting with the general standards, it is question-
able whether the auditors were truly independent 7
8 11d. at 807. This statement underscores the inference
that juries seem to draw in complex financial fraud cases-
how could persons so involved in the company's affairs
not be aware of the illegal activity?
84Id. at 808.
8 Id. at 799.
"
8Comment, 'Two Cases Dealing With CPA's Legal
Liability-Analysis: Recommendations, 10 Am. Bus. LJ.
83, 86 (1972). See also Brief for American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae, United
States v. Simon, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970), reprinted in 129J.
AccOUNTANCY 69 (May 1970).
"
7Certainly one of the prime reasons why certified
financial statements are so useful is because the auditor is
independent and without bias in reaching his opinion. It is
independence in mental attitude which gives an audit report
credibility and differentiates it from a self-serving state-
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throughout their examination. They were perhaps
biased and had a need to protect their professional
reputations because of their failure in earlier audits
to disclose Roth's activities. Also, their audits may
not have been conducted with due care. 8 This is
illustrated in the auditors' failure to bring Continen-
tal's problem to the attention of other firm members
perhaps less biased, for evaluation and recommenda-
tions. A lack of due care also resulted from the
auditors' failure to comply with the standards of
fieldwork and reporting.
As for the fieldwork standards, there were two
compliance violations. First, the auditors did not
really obtain sufficient, competent evidence 9 and
documentation of the collateral's value 9" or the true
value of the Valley receivable. Considering the long
history of the Valley receivable which the auditors
were aware of, it seems almost inconceivable that
they did not vigorously investigate these items.
Second, it is open to question whether the auditors
properly relied on Continental's system of internal
control as a basis for their subsequent testing. For
instance, at no time did the accountants determine
whether Continental's board of directors ever ap-
proved the loan to Valley, a fact that takes on added
significance considering the length of time this
financing continued. It would seem reasonable to
conclude that a wholehearted application of these
fieldwork standards would have alerted an independ-
ent auditor to the irregularities taking place.
Finally, the disclosure standard of reporting which
requires that a lack of informative disclosure be
pointed out in the audit opinion was not met. In
light of the auditors' long acquaintance with Roth's
actions, Continental's severe liquidity problems, and
the lack of earlier disclosure, it seems unbelievable
that the financial statement gave no indication of how
the Valley receivable was collateralized. Yet the
audit opinion did not alert a financial statement user
to this serious lack of disclosure.
Recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
ment. See note 18 supra.
8 8The standard of due care articulates the notion of
professionalism and thoroughness to which a public ac-
countant must adhere. See note 18 supra.
"
9The standards of fieldwork provide an auditor with
important guidelines that must be followed throughout an
audit. They are somewhat more practical in scope than the
general standards. See note 19 supra.
9' In confirming the posted collateral's value, the audi-
tors called various banks and brokers, and later received
written confirmations. This technique, however, did not
disclose the full extent to which Roth's holdings were
otherwise pledged as security for various loans. Thus, the
collateral was worth even less had Continental attempted to
collect. 425 F.2d at 810-13.
applied the Simon rationale in affirming the convic-
tion of two auditors from a major international
accounting firm for violating section 32(a) of the
Exchange Act. In United States v. ,Vatelb,91 the
auditors were charged with creating a deliberately
false explanatory footnote. The footnote attempted to
reconcile sales and earnings as originally certified
with the revised figures submitted in a proxy state-
ment filed with the SEC. The accountants were also
charged with knowing that an interim financial
statement in the proxy, albeit unaudited, materially
misstated and distorted the period's sales and earn-
ings.
The need for an explanatory footnote arose be-
cause of the manner in which National Student
Marketing Corporation (NSM) originally reported
its 1968 results. NSM, in the business of designing
and furnishing specialized marketing services for the
youth market, felt that the appropriate time to
recognize income and sales occurred when the clients
committed themselves to the program. The auditors
agreed that, to the extent work on a client's program
was complete, the same percentage of gross income
would be recognized." These "commitments" were
not in writing and had not been booked in fiscal
1968; early in the next fiscal period the accountants
agreed to retroactively book S1.7 million in pur-
ported "commitments" as part of the 1968 figures. 9'
Without this adjustment NSM would have shown a
large loss for 1968 instead of almost a doubling of
profit. " - This was especially important because
NSM's publicly traded securities had risen dramati-
cally in the past few months. 9 5 No criminal charge
was directly based, upon this decision to record the
1968 figures in this fashion; however, criminal
charges were made based on later events.
After a clean audit opinion for 1968 was issued,
the auditors informed NSM that in the future only
written contracts would meet their approval. This
afterthought about the 1968 "commitments" was
justified: within five months after the certification
issued, over $1.0 million of these sales were written
91527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3592 (U.S., Apr. 19, 1976) (No. 75-808).
"The accountants used the percentage-of-completion
approach customarily used in construction projects to
record the income and costs to date. Here the yardstick was
the proportion of time an account executive spent on a
project relative to the total estimated time necessary to
complete the job.
11527 F.2d at 316. A rather feeble attempt to confirm
these "commitments" was termed "haphazard" by the
court. Id. at 315-16.
9 1d. at 316.
95 1d. at 315.
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off NSM's books. 96 The reduction was recorded, in
part, as a decrease from NSM's 1969 sales, the
balance being accounted for as a decrease in 1968
sales. However, despite these changes, no changes
were made to NSM's 1968 earnings. Ajournal entry
which the accountants designed to effect the earnings
reduction was netted by them against an unrelated
tax credit so that the actual change in profit seemed
much smaller and immaterial. "This net adjustment
thus concealed very important facts about NSM's
operations and the real value of its receivables. 9"
In 1969, as part of its ambitious acquisition
program, NSM drafted a proxy statement. The
auditors attempted to reconcile the 1968 certified
results with the restated amounts after the writeoffs
and acquisitions. 9 The court observed:
The earnings summary in the proxy statement in-
cluded companies acquired after fiscal 1968 and
their pooled earnings. The footnote was the only place
in the proxy statement which would have permitted an
interested investor to see what Marketing's perform-
ance had been in its preceding fiscal year 1968, as
retroactively adjusted, separate from the earnings and
sales of the companies it had acquired in fiscal 1969.100
Yet despite the urgent need for disclosure, the
footnote did not reflect the write-off of the oral
"commitments"; rather the total decrease was im-
properly deducted from the sales and earnings of the
acquired companies. There was no disclosure any-
where that over $1.0 million in previously reported
sales were written off. Such presentation violated
"1d. at 316.
"Deferred taxes arise because a corporation can report
the timing of income and expense items differently for tax
purposes than for financial statement presentation. This is
ordinary and accepted accounting practice. Here, NSM had
a S613,000 loss for tax purposes in 1968. On the financials,
however, the auditors had set up an amount for eventual tax
liability because of the "commitments." A specialist in the
accounting firm determined that since NSM had an
operating tax loss carryforward which could be used to
offset future income (including any income from "commit-
ments"), there was no need to maintain the deferred tax
liability. Brief for Appellant Natelli at 16, United States v.
Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975).
"
0An investor would, of course, be extremely interested
in the write-off of the oral "commitments" because it raised
important questions about NSM's credibility in reporting
sales and earnings. The inquiry would still be important
even though the net effect after the tax credit was only
$21,000. 527 F.2d at 316-17.
99NSM acquired companies on a pooling-of-interests
basis. Under this method of consolidating earnings; finan-
cial results of the acquired firms are reflected for the whole
fiscal period and not just for the period subsequent to
acquisition.
100527 F.2d at 317.
Opinion No. 9 of the Accounting Principles
Board-Reporting the Results of Operations. 1o1
The proxy also contained an interim financial
statement which, while not audited, "was prepared
by the Company with the assistance of Peat [the
accounting firm] on the same... basis as in the 1968
audited statement." 112 Just prior to printing the
interim statement, the senior auditor on the job
refused to treat a $1.2 million commitment from
Pontiac Motor Division as a sale because there was
no legally binding obligation. NSM's chairman
immediately claimed to have a commitment from
Eastern Airlines for a somewhat comparable
amount; the final proxy included the Eastern "sale"
but deleted the Pontiac "commitment." 10' Later, im-
mediately before the proxy's filing with the SEC,
a new staff auditor on the NSM audit recommended
that a further substantial write-off take place, yet
the other accountants decided against such action. 104
When the proxy statement was sent to the SEC,
[tihere was no disclosure that Marketing had written
off $1 million of its 1968 sales (over 20%) and over $2
million of the S3.3 million in unbilled sales booked in
1968 and 1969. A true disclosure, which was not
made, would have shown that without these unbilled
receivables, Marketing had no profit in the first nine
months of 1969. 000
"'
0 Id. The opinion sets guidelines for the presentation
of extraordinary items in a company's financial statements
and provides for the prior period adjustment of certain
other items. A.IERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS, OPINION No. 9 (1966).
102527 F.2d at 317.
103 The auditors apparently felt that the letter NSM
received fromi Pontiac did not create a-binding obligation.
NSM was disturbed about this, even offering to fly the
senior auditor to Detroit to meet Pontiac officials. Brief for
Appellant Natelli at 27-28, United States v. Natelli,
527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975). The government contended
that the abrupt substitution of the Eastern contract for the
Pontiac commitment was done under suspicious circum-
stances. Although the auditors made some feeble attempts
to verify the Eastern "sale," Eastern Airlines was never
contacted. Brief for Appellee 'at 30-31, United States v.
Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975).
Given this seemingly effortless switch of the two con-
tracts, it remains to be seen why NSM did not try to gather
sufficient evidence to support inclusion of the Pontiac
contract as well. Since the Eastern sale was so easily ac-
cepted it probably would not have been all that difficult to
upgrade the Pontiac contract. Then, NSM could have
shown even more favorable earnings since both items were
included. Hence, NSM's sudden retreat from the Pontiac
sale might well have been an area the accountants ought to
have questioned.
"
4 The recommendation called for an additional
$320,000 write-off on top of the previously discussed
decrease of over $1 million. 527 F.2d at 318.
105MI.
Reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence mar-
shalled to show the accountants' guilt, the Second
Circuit articulated some of the difficulties inherent in
most criminal cases against public accountants. "'1
Nevertheless, the court discerned a motive for the
auditors to conceal the truth about NSM. Like the
defendants in Simon, earlier improper or mistaken
accounting practices, here the initial treatment of the
1968 unbilled receivables, were never rectified.
Thus, in order to safeguard their professional reputa-
tions and escape criticism, these problems were
covered up. 1.0
The court first analyzed the evidence concerning
the allegedly false footnote accompanying the 1968
certified financials:
Honesty should have impelled appellant to disclose in
the footnote which annotated their own audited state-
ment for fiscal 1968 that substantial write-offs had
been taken, after year end, to reflect a loss for the year.
A simple desire to right the wrong that had been
perpetrated on the stockholders and others by the false
audited financial statement should have dictated that
course. 10'
The court did not consider it critical that there had
been no re-audit for 1968 because "[t] he accountant
owes a duty to the public not to assert a privilege of
silence until the audited annual statement comes
around in due time." 19 Nor was the argument that
the disclosure was not material persuasive; the
concealment, cloaked as a reduction in pooled earn-
ings of acquired companies, buried NSM's true
operating results which would likely have had an
impact upon anyone who used those financial
statements. 11o
The court then turned to the Eastern contract
which it characterized as "a matter for deep suspi-
cion because it was substituted so rapidly for the
Pontiac contract.""1' The accountants contended
1
"
6The court prefaced its analysis with the following
statement:
It is hard to probe the intent of a defendant. Circum-
stantial evidence, particularly with proof of motive,
where available, is often sufficient to convince a
reasonable man of criminal intent beyond a reasonable
doubt. When we deal with a defendant whb is a
professional accountant, it is even harder, at times, to
distinguish between simple errors of judgment and
errors made with sufficient criminal intent to support a
conviction, especially when there is no financial gain to
the accountant other than his legitimate fee.
Id. at 318.




that they had no duty to verify the "sale" because it
was included in unaudited financial statements. 12 In
response, the court noted that it was the auditors,
rather than the company, who controlled the figures,
as illustrated by the last-minute rejection of the
Pontiac contract for inclusion in the interim
financials. 13 Furthermore, even though the account-
ants were not performing an NSM audit, they
nevertheless were "associated" with the statements
according to their own professional standards 4 and
were required to object to anything in those state-
ments known to be materially false. While being
"associated" with financial statements does not
ordinarily impose a heavy burden on an auditor, the
court concluded:
We do not think this means, in terms of professional
standards, that the accountant may shut his eyes in
reckless disregard of his knowledge that highly suspi-
cious figures, known to him to be suspicious, were
being included in the unaudited earnings figures with
which he was "associated" in the proxy statement. "15
The court also found no error in the trial court's
instructions to the jury concerning the requisite
knowledge necessary under the indictment. '16 These
instructions closely tracked those earlier approved in
Simon. Under this test, reckless disregard for the
truth of the financial statements or deliberately
closing one's eyes to obvious economic truths will
support an inference of knowledge sufficient to
support a criminal charge based upon section 32(a)
of the Exchange Act. 1
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS: ANALYSIS
Accountants are extremely disturbed about these
recent criminal cases, especially Simon and Natelli,
and are anxiously awaiting the outcome of several
pending actions"' to see if the trend toward finding
"'Both amicus curiae briefs primarily dealt with the
distinction between a professional accountant's audit and
non-audit responsibilities. See note 8 supra.
113527 F.2d at 320.
'..An auditor is "associated" with unaudited financial
statements "when he has consented to the use of his name in
a report, document, or written communication setting forth
or containing the statements." SAS No. 1, supra note 14, §
516.03. If a CPA who is so associated concludes that the
financial statements are not in conformity with GAAP,
including adequate disclosure, he must insist upon a
disclaimer or clearly set forth his reservations. 1d. § 516.06.





8 The Equity Funding case, United States v. Gold-
blum, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
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criminal liability will continue. Since Simon, some
accountants have felt that adherence to GAAP and
GAAS is irrelevant when criminal charges face them.
Similarly, since the defendants in Natelli were found
guilty for not disclosing information about an unau-
dited interim financial statement, some accountants
truly wonder about the extent of their liability for
unaudited statements.
The profession takes a much more restrictive view
as to when criminal action against an accountant is
justified. As Wallace E. Olson, president of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
observed: "There is an obvious gap in what the
profession thinks and what the courts have said about
what constitutes a criminal act." 119
In taking such a restrictive position, the profession
may be compounding its troubles. Financial state-
ment users are demanding more explicit assurance
that a company is not engaging in fraud. Thus, when
the accountants try to expressly delineate and mini-
mize the limits of their responsibility, the final result
may be to polarize further financial statement users.
However, it is possible to analyze both Simon and
Natelli in a manner that is more compatible with
professional accounting standards and which will
reduce the friction between the profession and the
courts.
Neither Simon nor Natelli expressly held that
professional accounting standards were totally irrele-
vant in criminal cases involving accountants. 2 o In
Simon there was no explicit authoritative accounting
principle that specifically applied to Continental's
situation. The court, however, refused to condone the
statement's presentation just because it was other-
wise in compliance with GAAP. Hence, because
GAAP were not specific, the auditor's appropriate
responsibility was to honestly evaluate the financial
94,200, appeal docketed sub nom. United States v. Weiner,
No. 75-2973, 9th Cir., July 16, 1975, resulted in the con-
viction of three accountants. Wall St. J., May 21, 1975,
at 14, col. 3. An indictment was returned against a CPA
for preparing false and misleading statements for Ameri-
can Funds Corporation, United States v. Riebold, SEC
Litigation Rel. No. 6674 (D. N. M., Jan. 10, 1975).
There is also an indictment pending against accountants
involved in the Home-Stake Production Co. scandal. Wall
St. J., July 9, 1975, at 1, col.Dl.
" Olson, A Look at the Responsibility Gap, 139 J.
ACCOUNTANCY 52, 57 (Jan. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Olson].
... Without some basic approach for an auditor to use in
determining the "fairness of financial statements," an
accountant's opinion would be less credible; each auditor
would have only a personal feeling as to what fairness is
instead of some agreed upon, formalized guidelines. Carmi-
chad, What Does the Independent Auditor's Opinion
Really Mean?, 138 J. ACCOUNTANCY 83, 84 (Nov. 1974).
statement's impact on anyone who might use the
figures. In making this evaluation the auditor must
consider his complete knowledge about the client.
The Simon court did leave an opening for the
application of professional standards. If the finan-
cials were not presented "fairly," the inquiry would
be whether the auditors acted in good faith. Compli-
ance with GAAP was relevant to this issue. What
happened in Simon was that GAAP were silent on
Continental's problem so compliance with GAAP
had little probative weight. Had there been an
express accounting principle that sanctioned the
auditors' actions, compliance with that principle
might have reflected the defendants' good faith and
led to a different result. Furthermore, had the
defendants really conducted a vigorous audit, prop-
erly applying GAAS, such facts would have been
quite important in resolving the good faith issue.
Natelli does not really buttress the contention that
professional accounting standards are inapplicable
when determining criminal responsibility. Part of the
criminal charge was based upon the auditors' "asso-
ciation" with the unaudited interim statement. In
analyzing the appropriate action which the account-
ants ought to have 'undertaken, the court expressly
resorted to a professional guideline delineating
responsibility when an auditor is "associated" with a
misleading financial statement. 121 This appears to
be the first time a court has evaluated an accountant's
alleged criminal conduct solely with reference to
professional standards.
Simon and Natelli do not establish a definite rule
about the relevancy of using proof of compliance with
professional standards in evaluating criminal con-
duct. The fundamental issue in these cases is whether
the financials fairly and honestly present the underly-
ing economic results. Compliance with professional
standards is a useful measure in resolving this issue,
but cannot be considered apart from an assessment of
whether the financial statements honestly and mean-
ingfully convey relevant financial facts. This ap-
proach takes on added significance when one realizes
that the complexity and diversity of modern business
transactions make it impossible to develop explicit
accounting principles for each and every conceiable
situation.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Although these criminal cases have evoked strong
negative reactions from the accounting profession,
they have stimulated changes in auditing procedure
as well. Accountants are now realizing that certain
facts often may be the danger signals that fraudulent
"
2
'See note 114 supra.
1976]
activity is being carried on, and that some business
arrangements are particularly susceptible to fraud
and thus require more extensive auditing. Addition-
ally, there is some feeling in the financial community
calling for an investigation into the responsibilities of
executives who design and implement fraudulent
schemes.
Several symptoms that are easy for an auditor to
recognize ought to arouse his curiosity. Litigation
against accountants "occurs in conjunction with
business failures or companies that have encountered
severe setbacks."12 Almost without exception the
companies engaging in fraud are either extremely
short of cash and working capital or have an urgent
need for a continued flow of favorable earnings to
support stock prices, or both. 23 Solid operating
results are noticeably absent in these companies.
This message is finally being translated into audit
practice; 124 observers of financial statements noted
that 1974 annual reports contained more auditing
reservations and qualifications of opinion than in
prior years. 125
Additionally, the accounting profession has taken
some key steps to improve audit procedures. First, a
commission to examine the modern audit function
and its responsibilities has been established. ' Sec-
ond, recently pronounced Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 6-Related Party Transactions, 127
stresses the vital importance for an auditor to discern
substance over form when reviewing transactions
between "related parties" and provides guidelines
for audit procedures and appropriate disclosure.
Although several specific illustrations of related
parties are provided, 12' the basic definition is
122 Olson, supra note 119, at 53.
12 Address by Douglas R. Carmichael before the New
Mexico Society of Certified Public Accountants, May 6,
1975, noted in BNA SEC. L. REP. D-2 (May 14, 1975).
124 See, e.g., Chazen & Solomon, The Art of Defensive
Auditing, 140 J. ACCOUNTANCY 66 (Oct. 1975). This
article points out a number of circumstances that an auditor
ought to closely scrutinize. Id. at 68-69.
121Wall St. J., Apr. 17, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
'
2 6The wave of litigation has influenced audit practice
within accounting firms. THE ComMIsSION ON AUDITOR'S
RESPONSIBILITIES, STATEMENT OF ISSUES: SCOPE AND OR-
GANIZATION OF THE STUDy OF AUDITORS' RESPONSIBIL-
ITIES (1975). See also Bedingfield, The Effect of Recent
Litigation on Audit Practice, 137 J. ACCOUNTANCY 55
(May 1974). In particular, one large firm has recently
hired another accounting firm to review its audit practices
and quality control, a rather unprecedented step. Wall St.
J., May 22, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
1 2
"IANERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC A-
CCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 6
(1975).
128For example, related parties specifically include the
any other party with which the reporting entity may
deal when one party has the ability to significantly
influence the management or operating policies of the
other, to the extent that one of the transacting parties
might be prevented from fully pursuing its own
separate interests. 129
This is an important expansion of audit procedure
because such related-party transactions can easily
hide fraudulent activities. The guidelines are no
doubt partially in response to increasing securities
fraud. 130
Even though these criminal cases underscore the
need for auditors to be alert to fraudulent schemes,
they do not burden only the public accountant with
greater responsibility for financial statements. It is
still agreed that financial statements are primarily
management representations, 1' even though the
accountants play an important role in designing
footnotes and recommending journal entries. SEC
Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr. has pointed out the
neglected attention that financial executives who
have masterminded the fraud scheme receive:
First, I would suggest that the totality of the inside
professional's responsibilities to the investing public is
as broad as and even broader than that of the outside
independent accountant.... [1it is the obligation of the
inside financial officer, as it is of the auditor, at least
since the Simon case, to determine whether the
financial statements present fairly the financial posi-
tion and results of operations of the enterprise. 132
Recently a federal grand jury indicted two former
officers of King Resources, Inc. for assorted securities
fraud violations. "' A large part of the charge against
them is that they knowingly and intentionally sought
to deceive King's auditors to prevent them from
learning the truth. Thus, the increased wave of cases
against accountants may have even greater implica-
tion for financial executives engaging in fraudulent
schemes.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most definite caveat that an account-
ant should keep in mind when auditing is that his
best defense to potential criminal charges is simply to
reporting entity's affiliates, principal owners, management,
and members of their immediate families. Id. § 2.
1291d.
1"'Wall St. J., March 31, 1975, at 14, col. 2.
'
2 1 See note 47 supra.
'2Address by- A.A. Sommer, Jr. before the Cleveland
Treasurers Club, November 14, 1973, in 137 J.
ACCOUNTANCY 71, 72 (Apr. 1974).




have performed a thorough audit. Affirmative appli-
cation of GAAS will uncover many kinds of fraud
and provide a solid basis upon which to base a good
faith defense. Yet, while applying GAAS, the auditor
must be aware of the resulting impact that a certain
manner of presentation will have on the financial
statement user.
This approach is consistent with the conclusion
reached by a special committee of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants convened to
review the massive fraud of the Equity Funding
debacle. The committee concluded that a full applica-
tion of GAAS and "customary audit procedures
properly applied would have provided a reasonable
degree of assurance that the existence of fraud at
Equity Funding would be detected.""'
This is not to suggest that auditors should be
obstinate and make unyielding demands about every
item presented in financial statements. Rather, in
making decisions about whether the financials really
present economic realities, the auditor must insist
upon presentation that is complete, fair to the user,
and, above all, honest, for this will provide the au-
ditor with his strongest defense to federal criminal
charges.
134AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC AC-
COUNTANTS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL' COMMITTEE ON
EQurry FUNDING 27 (1975).
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EQUAL TREATMENT FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN THE ALLOWANCE OF
A TAX DEDUCTION FOR LEGAL EXPENSES
INTRODUCTION
A criminal defendant's "right to the assistance of
counsel" under the sixth amendment to the
Constitution' gained considerable vitality in 1963
with the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v.
Wanwright.2 In Gideon, the Court held that a
criminal defendant charged with a state felony
prosecution is entitled to the services of an attorney
even if he cannot afford one. Gideon marked the
beginning of a liberal interpretation by the Court of
the "right to counsel" portion of the sixth
amendment. 3
The repercussions of Gideon were also felt in the
sphere of federal income tax law. In the 1966
landmark decision of Commissioner v. Tellier, 4 the
Supreme Court held that a taxpayer, a securities
dealer convicted of violating both the Securities Act of
1933 and the Mail Fraud Act, could deduct the
cost of his criminal defense from his gross income as
an ordinary and necessary business expense. The
decision in Tellier overturned the traditional rule,
based on public policy, of prohibiting a deduction if
the taxpayer had been convicted. The dubious
justification for the rule was that the taxpayer-
defendant would otherwise receive an "indirect
subsidy" for his unlawful activities, thereby frustrat-
ing the authorities' efforts to halt such activity.
Recognizing the harshness of this rule and its
inconsistency with a criminal defendant's right to
'counsel under the sixth amendment, the Court
emphasized that it could never be against public
policy to permit a taxpayer to defend himself in a
criminal prosecution. Further, the Court held that no
public policy would be frustrated by permitting a
deduction for the defendant's legal expenses on his
tax return. While its potential application to all
criminal defendants is apparent, the Tellier doctrine
1
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3 See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975) (the "right to counsel" includes the right to defend
oneself); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1971)
(counsel must be provided for an indigent defendant faced
with possible incarceration).
'383 U.S. 687 (1966).
is limited by the Supreme Court's earlier decision in
United States v. Gilmore' to a claim which "arises m
connection with the taxpayer's [trade or business or]
profit-seeking activities." 6
The interrelationship between tax and criminal
law presented by these two cases will be analyzed in
this comment. It is surprising to note the myopic
treatment which this interrelationship has received
by the courts and legal commentators. The thrust
of the analyses in the writings by legal scholars has
often been confined to a simple expository of the
latest significant tax decision, which is then accepted
virtually without consideration as to its possible
impact on the criminal law.' The purpose of this
comment is to closely examine this area of the law,
largely untouched by previous writings.
The survey will begin with a summary of the
present state of the law concerning tax deductions for
legal expenses. Then, the applicable tax law will be
analyzed and criticized for its internal inconsistencies
and deficiencies. First, it will be shown that the
courts, in resolving the issues of statutory interpreta-
tion presented in cases following Gilmore and Tel-
lier, have articulated a highly artificial distinction
which is discriminatory in its application to the
criminal defendant in the tax arena: "business
misconduct" versus "personal misconduct." Second,
it will be shown that the scope of Gilmore's
"origins" test, when judged on its own terms, tends
to be too inclusive at times, and too exclusive at other
times. Third, it will be shown that the "origins" test
'372 U.S. 39 (1963).
6 1d. at 48. This is the "origins" test which will be
criticized later in this comment.7For a general discussion of the deductibility of legal
expenses see Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income
Tax, 12 TAX. L. REV. 241, 274-75 (1957); Schlenker, Tax
Deductibility of Legal Expenses, 54 A.B.A.J. 199 (1968);
Snyder, Legal Fees: Their Deductibility, 57 ILL. BAR J.
488 (1969); Troiano, Deduction of Legal Fees as Ordinary
and Necessary Business Expenses-The Unsuccessful De-
fense of Criminal Prosecutions, 33 BROOKLYN L. REV. 280
(1967); Comment, Income Tax Deductibility of Attorneys'
Fees Incurred in Unsuccessful Criminal Defense, 114 U.
PA. L. REV. 274 (1965).
One commentator has touched upon the problems
presented in this comment. See Note, A General Practition-
er's Guide to the Deductibility of Attorneys'Fees, 5 GA. L.
REv. 751 (1971).
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is inadequate to effectively classify, for the purpose of
a deduction for legal expenses, the myriad of crimes
in existence. In the next section of the comment the
"integral" test, a more useful mechanism consistent
with the principles enunciated by the courts, will be
proposed.
The focus of the comment will then shift its
emphasis to the criminal defendant in the tax arena.
A possible judicial response to Gilmore, rejecting the
rigidity of the "origins" test, will be explored. A
modified "consequences" test, abandoned in Gil-
more, will be proposed. This test, although retaining
vestiges of the business-versus-personal distinction
drawn by the Internal Revenue Code, contains a
conclusive presumption of a business motivation in
defending against a criminal charge, and thus allows
a deduction to all criminal defendant-taxpayers
for the cost of defense expenses.
Continuing this theme, the next major section of
the comment will offer a theoretical income tax
discussion supporting an amendment of the Code
itself to allow an across-the-board deduction for all
legal expenses incurred in defense of a criminal pro-
secution. To illustrate this argument, legal expenses
will be analogized to medical expenses, already ac-
corded a personal deduction in the Code on a theory
consistent with tax policy.
Finally, possible alternatives to a tax deduction,
such as prepaid legal service programs and expanded
public defender programs, will be discussed and
criticized with a view toward providing effective
assistance of counsel for the majority of society. The
ultimate position to be taken is that an amendment to
the Code providing for a tax credit for criminal
defense expenses, a proposal consistent with sixth
amendment considerations, offers the most accepta-
ble solution to the severe problem of financing a
criminal defense. 8
5
"Legal expenses" (herein defined as attorney's fees and
court costs) incurred in the prosecution or defense of civil
actions are not within the scope of this comment. Significant
distinctions between civil and criminal litigation suggest a
different treatment for each under the tax deduction laws.
First, there is the constitutional difference. The sixth
amendment does not guarantee the right to counsel in civil
cases. While an enlightened public policy should certainly
demand the benefit of counsel in civil cases, constitutional
support exists only with respect to criminal cases. Deriv-
atively, tax treatment of civil legal expenses is unaffected
by the commands of the sixth amendment.
Second, the tax treatment of criminal legal expenses
needs closer scrutinization-because of the absence of genuine
alternatives to financing the litigation as found in civil cases.
Statutes exist which allow recovery of attorney's fees by the
plantiff or by the winning party in certain kinds of civil
A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE LAW CONCERNING THE
TAX TREATMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES
The Code contains several provisions relating to
various aspects of the criminal law, 9 but there is no
single provision in the Code explicitly covering the
deductibility of' legal expenses. Generally, legal
expenses incurred by individuals in the prosecution
or defense of any litigation are deemed to be personal
in nature and hence non-deductible under section
262. " However, the courts have engrafted a deduc-
tion for certain legal expenses into several existing
broadly-worded provisions of the Code. "
At present, a deduction for legal expenses is
permitted when the expenditure qualifies as an
ordinary and necessary trade or business expense
litigation. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §
216(b) (1970); Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. § 941
(1970); Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)
(1970). Granting attorney's fees is within the court's
discretion in the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970).
Recoverable attorney's fees reduces the financial obstacle to
bringing or defending a civil suit. However, no equivalent
mechanism exists for criminal litigation.
Third, there are indirect ways to recover litigation
expenses in civil cases. Where a suit for money damages is
brought, the jury award will often include the plaintiffs
legal expenses even though the plaintiffs recovery is not
intended to reflect such costs. Under the Code, if the dispute
is over capital property, the costs of the litigation can be
added to the basis of the property under INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 263. Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572
(1970). This amounts to a delayed deduction if the capital
item is depreciable. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167.
No comparable means of indirectly recouping legal ex-
penses is present in criminal litigation.
Fourth, in some types of personal injury litigation,
insurance will cover the cost of legal assistance. Except to
the limited extent that insurance or quasi-insurance is
available to defendants in criminal litigation, as discussed at
text accompanying notes 107-28 infra, this alternative is
also unavailable to criminal defendants.
9Section 162(c) disallows a trade or business expense
deduction for the payment of illegal bribes or kickbacks to
governmental employees, or any other unlawful bribe or
kickback. Section 162(f) disallows a trade or business
expense deduction for the payment of any fine or similar
penalty for a violation of any law. Section 162(g) disallows
a trade or business deduction for two-thirds of the treble
damages paid as a result of a criminal violation of the
antitrust laws. Section 165(d) permits losses from wagering
transactions only to the extent of the gains from such
transactions. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 162(c),(f),(g),
165(d).
"°Section 262 provides: "Except as otherwise expressly
provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for
personal, living, or family expenses." INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 262.
iiSee Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
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under section 162(a). 12 A "trade or business" has
been defined as "extensive activity over a substantial
period of time during which the taxpayer holds
himself out as selling goods or services."13 Thus, if
the expenses are incurred in the defense of a criminal
charge, then the criminal charge itself must at least
relate somehow to the taxpayer's trade or business.
In Tellier, for instance, the defendant had been found
guilty of violating the Securities Act of 1933,14 the
Mail Fraud Act, " and of conspiring to violate
."Section 162(a) provides: "There shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business .... " INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a). This
section applies to both individuals and corporations.
13McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir.
1961). See Rev. Rul. 58-5, 1958-1 CrNai. BULL. 322. See also
Folker v. Johnson, 230 F.2d 906, 907 (2d Cir. 1956) (for
IRS purposes, the phrase "'trade or business' has a com-
mon and well-understood connotation as referring to ac-
tivity or activities in which a person engages for purposes
of earning a livelihood"); Wooten v. United States, 41 F.
Supp. 496, 497 (N.D. Tex. 1941) ("trade or business" re-
fers to a "regular occupation or calling of the taxpayer, for
the purpose of livelihood or profit"). None of these defini-
tions is particularly helpful in determining what criminal
activities may be considered to have "arisen in connection
with" the "trade or business." The definitions Mso provide
few clues as to when a criminal activity itself will be con-
sidered a "trade or business."
1415 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3) (1970), which the defendant in
Telher was charged with violating, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or
sale of any securities by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly
or indirectly
(3) to engage in any transaction, prac-
tice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
the purchaser.
1518 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money
or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of,
loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or
furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or
spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or
anything represented to be or intimated or held out to
be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose
of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so
to do, places in any post office or authorized deposi-
tory for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to
be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or
receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to
the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is
addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not
more than S1,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
those statutes. 1" The Commissioner conceded that
the charges undoubtedly arose 1 7 from the defendant's
business as a securities dealer, so the relation of the
criminal charge to the trade or business went
uncontested. The same result would follow if an
officer of a corporation were charged with a violation
of the antitrust laws, and the legal expenses would be
deductible by the corporation itself if it had an
indemnification plan for wrongful acts by its agents
done in the course of their employment. "
Another requirement for section 162(a) is that the
trade or business expense be "ordinary and neces-
sary." For many types of expenses, the "ordinary
and necessary" restriction can be a difficult hurdle to
overcome. But, with respect to legal expenses in-
curred as a defense to a criminal prosecution (regard-
less of the outcome), the Supreme Court has reduced
the requirement to a determination of whether the
ordinary reaction of a businessman to the particular
situation would be to incur the expense and has
concluded that in all cases it would be. 1" One should
also be able to draw the inference that the reasona-
bleness of the expenditure is not relevant. In other
1-618 U.S.C. § 371 (1970) provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit
any offense against the United States, or to defraud
the United States, or any agency thereof in any
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspir-
acy, each shall be fined 'not more than S10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
17See the discussion of the "origins" test at notes 27-30
and accompanying text infra.
181n Central Coat, Apron & Linen Service, Inc. v.
United States, 298 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the
corporate taxpayer was allowed to deduct payments of all
legal expense6, except fines paid, incurred by the corpora-
tion and its president in defense of a prosecution for
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. In permitting a
corporate deduction for its president's attorney's fees, the
court relied on the indemnification plan that protected
corporate officers in situations such as this one.
19This definition of "ordinary and necessary" was
established in the oft-cited case of Welch v. Helvering, 290
U.S. 111 (1933), wherein Justice Cardozo stated:
Ordinary in this context does not mean that the
payments must be habitual or normal in the sense that
the same taxpayer will have to make them often. A
lawsuit affecting the safety of a business may happen
once in a lifetime. The counsel fees may be so heavy
that repetition is unlikely. None the less, the expense
is an ordinary one because we know from experience
that payments for such a purpose, whether the
amount is large or small, are the common and
accepted means of defense against attack.
290 U.S. at 114 (citation omitted). This quote, of course,
presumes that the crime was of a business origin. For Jus-
tice Cardozo's "lawsuit affecting the safety of a business,"
the thrust of the inquiry is with the businessman's motiva-
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words, since a reasonable businessman would be
expected to litigate his case to the hilt, even astro-
nomical expenditures should come within the pur-
view of the rule.
Although the conditions for deductibility under
section 162(a) are relatively straightfor'ward, appli-
cation of the "trade or business" requirement has
created several peculiar holdings in the case law. For
example, in Peckham v. Commissioner,2 a doctor
'convicted of performing an illegal abortion was
denied a deduction for his legal defense expenses on
the ground that he failed to show that the abortion
was related to the business of practicing medicine.
This curious holding cannot logically be explained
simply by asserting that only lawful medical prac-
tices are contemplated to be within a doctor's
business because the law draws no distinction be-
tween "lawful" and "unlawful" businesses. 2' Two
tion in defending the suit: to avoid the adverse business
consequences.
The "ordinary and necessary" restriction was clarified
by the Court in Tellier:
Our decisions have consistently construed the term
"necessary" as imposing only the minimal require-
ment that the exptnse be "appropriate and helpful"
for "the development of the [taxpayer's] business."
(citations omitted). The principal function of the
term "ordinary" in § 162 (a) is to clarify the distinc-
tion, often difficult, between those expenses that are
currently deductible and those that are in the nature of
capital expenditures, which, if deductible at all, must
be amortized over the useful life of the asset. (citation
omitted)
383 U.S. at 689-90. In making this sweeping determina-
tion, the Court also disposed of two other conditions which
normally confront a taxpayer who seeks to make a trade or
business deduction: (1) the capital expenditure limitation
and (2) the public policy limitation.
If the legal expenses are incurred in connection with a
capital asset, section 263 requires that the expenses be
added to the cost basis of the asset instead of being deducted
during the taxable year incurred. See, e.g., United States v.
Wheeler, 311 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 818 (1963) (suit for specific performance of a contract
to sell the taxpayers stock); Laemmle v. Eisner, 275 F. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1920) (suit initiated to acquire control of a
corporation's stock). Since the Court held that the expenses
were incurred in a defense against a charge of past criminal
misconduct, and not in the acquisition of a capital asset, this
restriction does not apply to criminal defense fees. 383 U.S.
at 690.
The public policy limitation, eliminated by the Court in
Tellier, will be discussed at text accompanying notes
87-106 infra.
20327 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1964).
2 1 In Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958), the
Supreme Court held that amounts expended to lease
premises and hire employees for the operation of gambling
enterprises, illegal under Illinois state law, were deductible
as ordinary and necessary business expenses under the
possible explanations for the decision are either that
the defendant failed to prove that abortions were a
continuous or extensive part of his practice (which in
1964 he surely would not have admitted), or that
he was not compensated for performing it and
therefore it was a voluntary and personal
undertaking. 2 If, in fact, either of those two possibil-
ities existed, then the criminal charge probably did
not arise out of the defendent-taxpayer's trade or
business.
A second provision which has been interpreted to
allow deductions for legal expenses is section 212,24
which was enacted in 1942 to equalize treatment
between taxpayers engaged in a trade or business
with those simply engaged in a profit-seeking, but
non-business, activity. 2" Section 212 allows a tax
predecessor to section 162(a)(3). The Court feared that a
decision to the contrary would have meant that Sullivan's
illegal business would have been taxed on the basis of gross
receipts, while other businesses would have been taxed on
the basis of net income. The Court could find no rational
justification for this distinction in the Code.
Admittedly, Congress has subsequently chosen to pro-
hibit trade or business deductions for certain business
expenses (note 9 supra), but it has never disallowed
deductions on the basis of the type of business involved.
"This is a rather stringent test for a "trade or business."
The defendant might have been more successful had he
relied upon section 212 of the Code. See notes 27-30 and
accompanying text infra.
2 There, was no evidence presented on this point. But,
that a voluntary undertaking in the course of one's business
activities is not consideied a part of his business activities is
an important concept. In Friedman v. Delaney, 171 F.2d
269 (1st Cir. 1948), a voluntary payment of a bankruptcy
deposit by the lawyer-taxpayer on behalf of his client was
held to be nondeductible because it was not an "ordinary"
or "necessary" expense of being a lawyer. The taxpayer
argued that the deposit was paid by him because he gave his
word that it would be paid, and that the ethics of his
profession compelled him to honor his word. The court
rejected his argument, terming his moral obligation an
"extra-professional liability." Id. at 271.
This limitation becomes especially crucial in discussing




In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed
as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year-
(1) for the production or collection of in-
come;
(2) for the management, conservation, or
maintenance of property held for the
production of income; or
(3) in connection with the determination,
collection, or refund of any tax.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212.2 S5ee United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39," 44-46
(1963). In Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941),
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deduction for expenses incurred for the production or
collection of income, for the management, conserva-
tion, or maintenance of property held for the pro-
duction of income, or in connection with the pay-
ment of any tax. This section attempts to distinguish
those activities carried on primarily as a hobby or
sport from those engaged in for profit. According to
one court, to qualify for a section 212 deduction, the
taxpayer must "initiate or conduct the enterprise in
good faith with an intention of making a profit or of
producing income." 2 6 Typical examples of personal
profit-seeking activities are investments in stock or
securities, mineral interests, or real estate.
In order for legal expenses incurred in defense of a
criminal prosecution to qualify for a deduction under
section 212, the criminal charge must directly relate
to the profit-seeking activity. Or, as stated more
specifically in Gilmore v. United States, 2 the ex-
pense item involved must be one that has a business
origin.2 In Gilmore, the taxpayer had successfully
resisted an attempt by his former wife to appropriate
his income-producing stock during a property settle-
ment proceeding subsequent to the divorce. The
taxpayer then sought to use section 212 to deduct his
litigation expenses, arguing that they wei'e incurred
in the preservation of property held for the produc-
tion of income. Since the claim had arisen out of the
exacerbated marital relationship, it was held to be of
a personal origin, and the taxpayer's attempted
deduction was frustrated.
Though formulated in the context of a civil action,
the Supreme Court narrowly construed the phrase in sec-
tion 162 allowing deductions only for expenses incurred
"in carrying on any trade or business" by holding that the
activities of an individual in managing his securities
investments did not constitute the "carrying on of a trade or
business."2
1 International Trading Co. v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d
578, 584 (7th Cir. 1960). The "good faith" standard
attempts to distinguish business-like activities from per-
sonal activities where there is no real intent to yield a profit.
The "good faith" standard does not require that the
taxpayer actually show a profit, or even have a reasonable
expectation of one, but there must be a showing of an intent
to earn one. In International Trading, the corporate
taxpayer was not permitted to deduct certain upkeep
expenses incurred in maintaining land and buildings used
for stockholder residences and for business entertainment.
The court held that the homes were maintained primarily
for the personal benefit of the stockholders, even though the
stockholders paid rent. Id. at 580. This "primary pur-
pose" test finds its way into tax analysis with respect to
other sections as well. See, e.g., Woodward v. Commis-
sioner, 397 U.S. 572, 576 (1970) (capital expenditures,
§ 263).
2"372 U.S. 39 (1963).25Id. at 45.
the principle enunciated in Gilmore was applied
with equal force by Tellier to criminal actions: it is
the "origin" of the dispute leading to the legal
expenses, rather than the potential consequences of
losing the dispute, which determines whether such
expense is business-related or personal. 2 9 Put an-
other way, the characterization of the expense as
"business" or "personal" depends on whether or not
the claim arises in connection with the taxpayer's
trade or business or profit-seeking activities. 3'
Another interpretation of what deductions would
be allowed by sections 162(a) and 212 was rejected
by Gilmore. This test, called the "consequences"
test, permitted a deduction for the cost of legal
expenses if the consequence of the claim which
prompted the taxpayer to incur the expense involved
potential damage to his business or its assets.31
Beginning with Kornhauser v. United States,2
where the somewhat ambiguous standard was
whether the legal expenses were incurred "directly
connected with, or... proximately resulted from
[the] business,"" 2 the courts had vacillated between
the "origins" test and the "consequences" test. 34
9Id. at 49.
"
0Id. at 48. Precisely when a crime "arises in connection
with" the taxpayer's trade or business or profit-seeking
activities has never been fully determined. The text accom-
panying notes 38-75 is intended to shed some light on this
issue.
31Draper, 26 T.C. 201 (1956), acquiesced in, 1956-2
Cusi. BULL. 5 (prosecution of a libel action to protect
taxpayer's business); Salt, 18 T.C. 182 (1952) (expenses
incurred for advisement of legal rights where witness'
testimony before a Congressional committee could have
threatened witness-taxpayer's future business); Howard, 16
T.C. 157 (1951) (defense against a court martial).
32276 U.S. 145 (1928). In Kornhauser, the taxpayer
sought a deduction for legal expenses incurred in success-
fully defending an accounting suit brought by his former
law partner for shares of stock received for professional
services performed by the taxpayer during the existence of
the partnership, as claimed by the law partner, or after its
termination, as claimed by the taxpayer. Applying its test,
the Court granted the deduction.
"Id. at 153. Although the Court in Gilmore relied upon
Kornhauser as support for its "origins" test, the Korn-
hauser test seems to leave more avenues open for the
taxpayer. Since it does not speak strictly of "business
origins," legal expenses incurred simply to defend a
business would arguably fall within its ambit. This was
certainly suggested by Justice Cardozo in Welch v. Helver-
ing, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). See note 19 supra.
"See Gibbs, Post-Gilmore-Recent Trends in the
Deductibility of Professional Fees, 23 Sw. L.J. 644, 646
(1969). Compare Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S.
467 (1943) with Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118
(1952). See also Lewis v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 821 (2d
Cir. 1958); Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir.
1952).
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Gilmore effectively eliminated the "consequences"
test and the Kornhauser standard by construing the
latter to coincide with its "origins" test.
The primary concern of the Court in Gilmore was
with the logical extension of a "consequences" test as
applied to section 212. Most civil litigation involves a
plaintiff seeking property from a defendant, often
income-producing money. If either the plaintiff or
the defendant were given a choice as to whether or
not income-producing property was to be used to
satisfy the judgment, most would decide in the
affirmative, and thus the literal language of sections
212(1) and (2) referring to the "production" or
"maintenance" of income-producing property would
permit deductions for virtually all civil legal
expenses." Unwilling to allow the tax base to be
eroded so capriciously, the Court restricted the legal
expense deduction to claims arising out of profit-
seeking activities. By contrast, this concern has only
partial relevance to the potential consequences stem-
ming from a criminal action because the element of
choice of sanctions, including those not imposed by
the court, cannot be made by the defendant. His
choice, if any, is limited to the type of asset used to
pay a fine. Thus, based on its underlying rationale,
Gilmore arguably could have been limited to civil
actions.
However, the language of Gilmore was broad
enough to engulf the legal expenses of criminal
defendants and courts subsequent to Gilmore seized
upon it. Nadiak v. Commissioner" provides an
edifying illustration of this ramification. In NVadiak,
the taxpayer-defendant was an airline pilot. Legal
expenses incurred in a successful defense against
"The Court tempered its dissatisfaction with the "con-
sequences" test by offering the following hypothetical:
If two taxpayers are each sued for an automobile
accident while driving for pleasure, deductibility of
their litigation costs would turn on the mere circum-
stance of the character of the assets each happened to
possess, that is, whether the judgments against them
stood to be satisfied out of income-or nonincome-
producing property. We should be slow to attribute to
Congress a purpose producing such unequal treat-
ment among taxpayers, resting on no rational founda-
tion.
372 U.S. at 48. Even a situation such as the one described in
the Court's hypothetical could lead to a deduction for the
payments made if satisfied out of the cash assets of the
defendant. Cash itself is an income-producing asset because
it earns taxable interest. The Court spoke of "rational
foundations" for its distinction, but the fact that the
taxpayer-defendant could choose what type of asset with
which to satisfy the judgment also must have influenced the
Court.
3-356 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1966).
criminal charges of assault and battery and grand
larceny were held to be nondeductible because the
origin of the claim generating such expenses arose
out of his strained marital relationship. 3 The court
deemed it irrelevant to the issue of deductibility that
the taxpayer-defendant would have lost his pilot's
license if he had been convicted. That would have
been only an unfortunate "consequence." The court
reiterated that the claim or criminal charge must
have arisen in connection with the taxpayer's trade
or business or profit-seeking activity rather than with
any personal conduct.
AN EVALUATION OF THE PRESENT STATE
OF THE LAW
The net result of this development of judicially-
authorized deductions for legal expenses has been the
creation of a rigidly-applied "origins" test for
deductibility. The courts, relying upon the venerable
judicial declaration that all deductions are a "matter
of legislative grace,"" have grudgingly introduced
only a modicum of liberality into the Code with
respect to most criminal defendants. Predicated upon
"The "personal" nature of Nadiak's actions was not
questioned. The assault and battery charges were brought
by a friend of his former wife, and the larceny charges
stemmed from an allegation that he had taken property
belonging to his former wife. 356 F.2d at 911-12.
"The power to tax income like that of a new
corporation is plain and extends to the gross income.
Whether and to what extent deductions shall be
allowed depends upon legislative grace; and only as
there is clear provision therefor can any particular
deduction be allowed.
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440
(1934). See also Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 493
(1940).
The theory that all deductions are a matter of legislative
grace is subject to question. The sixteenth amendment
reads:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several states, and without
regard to any census or enumeration.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. If "income" means "net
income," then some deductions must be permitted. In
Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deduc-
tions Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of
Legislative Grace, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1142 (1943), the
author argues that the issue is one of statutory interpreta-
tion only, uninfluenced by the aspect of whether an income
item or a deduction item is involved. Griswold thought that
the structure and history of the income tax made it plain
that Congress intended to allow deductions as well as to tax
income. Id. at 1144. Also, Griswold points out that the
predecessors to section 162 were meant to be broad-to
cover "all the legitimate expenses attending the business."
26 CONG. REc. 6887 (1894) (remarks of Senaior Vest).
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the legislative policy of granting a deduction for the
cost of generating gross income, the "origins" test
excludes a defense expense deduction for all those
taxpayers who cannot show that their crime had a
business origin even though there may have been
valid business motivations for incurring the expense
itself. On the other hand, there is arguably a portion
of the criminal element that benefits unjustifiably
from its use: corporations and "white-collar" crimi-
nals who are able to fit their crime into the category
of business origin without a showing that tfie
commission of the crime was intended to generate
additional gross income..
The question posed by the "origins" test is
whether the crime arises in connection with the
taxpayer's business or profit-seeking activities. Or,
put another way, is the crime "business" or "person-
al" in nature? The phrase "arise in connection with"
is not self-explanatory: nevertheless, courts generally
have not undertaken to define it in the context of
criminal activity. In a 1968 Revenue Ruling, the IRS
added little content in suggesting the following
factors to be employed to determine deductibility on a
case-by-case method:
The determination of the character of the conduct from
which a given criminal charge arises or the source of
such a criminal charge is dependent upon a considera-
tion of all the facts and circumstances concerning the
taxpayer involved. In this connection, consideration is
given to, among other things, the acts committed or
alleged to have been committed, their relationship to
the taxpayer's business activities, how the taxpayer
conducts those activities (for example, what acts,
associations, relationships, and endeavors are involved
in the conduct of the taxpayer's business activities),
and whether being subject to the criminal offense
charged was an inherent risk of engaging in the
taxpayer's business activities."
"
9 Rev. Rul. 68-662. The IRS dealt with two hypotheti-
cal taxpayers. The first, a corporation's secretary-treasurer,
had diverted corporate funds to his personal use. Both the
corporation, the second taxpayer, and the secretary-treas-
urer were convicted of income tax evasion. Each attempted
to deduct the cost of legal expenses incurred in defense of the
prosecution for tax evasion. The IRS held that the
secretary-treasurer could deduct his legal expenses under
section 212(3) since that provision provided for a deduction
for expenses incurred in any proceeding for the determina-
tion of a tax. This is a very broad interpretation of section
212(3) because it does not require the taxpayer to show he
was engaging in a profit-seeking activity.
The IRS also held that the corporation could deduct its
legal expenses under section 162(a) (section 212(3) not
being applicable to corporations). The IRS reasoned that
the income tax evasion charge was of "business origins"
Except for the last clause, the IRS factors are hardly
more than reformulations of the general "origins"
test itself. Something more concrete is needed if
taxpayers are to be able to anticipate the IRS
reaction to a claim for a deduction for criminal
defense expenses and courts are expected to ration-
ally decide who is correct.
In Tellier, the Supreme Court was not confronted
with the issue because the Commissioner conceded
that the securities violations "arose in connection
with" the defendant's securities business. Implicit in
the Commissioner's position may have been a recog-
nition of the close relationship that securities laws
bear to the securities business. The Securities Act of
1933 by its very nature is a form of "business
regulation"-its purpose is to monitor and control
the ways of generating gross income within the
securities business. With few exceptions, only those
who are in the securities business doing securities
work could violate the securities law. " "But for"
the defendant's securities business he could not have
committed the crime. Thus, if the deductibility of
criminal defense expenses turns on crimes of "busi-
ness regulation," then the Supreme Court's applica-
tion of Gilmore to the taxpayer Tellier was correct.
If the Commissioner's concession in Tellier is read
narrowly, then arguably a crime arising in connec-
tion with business activities has a business origin
only if it is some type of "business regulation." If
that is the teaching of Telher, then some vexatious
problems arise, especially with respect to corpora-
tions. A corporation, although a business entity, is
criminally responsible for the acts of its agents if the
agent was acting within the scope of his employment
and if the violation was perpetrated in furtherance of
the corporation's ends. 4 A corporation, by having
the culpability of its agents imputed to it, can be held
criminally liable for many types of misconduct
because it was the duty of the secretary-treasurer to fill out
the tax return.
Unfortunately, the IRS did not comment on whether a
charge of embezzlement against the corporation's secre-
tary-treasurer would also be a crime with "business
origins." He did commit the crime under the color of his
office. See notes 55-62 and accompanying text infra for
further discussion on this subject.
4 This is a narrow reading of Telher, but it is consistent
with the Court's reasoning. If one looks to the type of
business involved in using the "origins" test, then it would
seem that only criminal laws designed to control the
activities traditionally associated with the operation of that
particular business would qualify under the "origins" test.
383 U.S. at 689.
" United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405,406-16 (1962).
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traditionally thought to be "personal" in nature .4
For instance, corporations can be subject to the laws
against involuntary manslaughter,' larceny,44 and
malicious destruction of property.' 5 For the corpora-
tion to be held criminally responsible in each of these
situations of "personal misconduct," the agents must
be acting in the regular course of their duties and in
furtherance of the corporate ends. 46 It could be
argued that these crimes, like crimes of "business
regulation," occur regularly and simply constitute an
inherent risk entailed in doing business. They may be
considered inevitable to a certain extent. This is
probably what the IRS meant in its Revenue Ruling
when it said: "[Clonsideration is given to...
whether being subject to the criminal offense
charged was an inherent risk of engaging in the tax-
payer's business activities." ' 47 If they are an inher-
ent risk, they present a compelling case under tra-
ditional tax theory for allowing a deduction for legal
expenses incurred in a defense of a criminal prose-
cution for them.
However, if in order to show that a crime "arises
in connection with" business activities one only has
to show that the agent was acting within the scope of
his employment and in furtherance of the corporate
4 2Jurisdictions used to limit corporate criminal liability
by holding that a corporation was incapable of committing
"specific intent" crimes. This position has been eroded by
modern decisions. See generally Comment, Corporate
Criminal Liability in Oregon: State v. Pacific Powder and
the New Oregon Criminal Code, 51 ORE. L. REV. 587
(1972). Of course, the corporation must be a "person"
capable of committing the crime. See United States v.
Hougland Barge Line, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Pa.
1974). And finally, if the penalty f6r the crime mandates
imprisonment, then the corporation cannot be held crimi-
nally liable even if it is a "person."
"
5 State v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A.
685 (1917).
"People v. Canadian Fur Trapper's Corp., 248 N.Y.
159, 161 N.E. 455 (1928).4 Cf. State v. Rowland Lumber Co., 153 N.C. 610, 69
S.E. 58 (1910).
4 The apparent contradiction between the dual intents
held by a corporate official who commits a "specific intent"
crime of personal violence while having the intent to benefit
the corporation has been a troublesome area. Only New
Jersey has extended corporate criminal responsibility to
crimes involving personal violence, specifically, homicide or
manslaughter. State v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 90 N.J.L. 372,
103 A. 685 (1917). See State v. Pacific Powder Co., 226
Ore. 502, 505, 360 P.2d 530, 531 (1961). However, People
v. Rochester Ry. & L. Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 107, 88 N.E. 22,
24 (1909) suggested that it would be within the legislative
power to enact specific legislation which would create
corporate criminal responsibility for crimes of personal
violence.
47 Rev. Rul. 68-662, 1968-2 CUM. BuLL. 69.
ends, the "origins" test becomes meaningless in this
situation. Although a corporation is presumed to be
engaged in a trade or business,' 8 it does not neces-
sarily follow that everything it does is ipso facto
business related. It does not follow that every crime
that a corporation may be liable for has a truly
"business origin." First, a corporation may be crimi-
nally liable even though the acts of its officers,
acting within the outer perimeters of their ex-
pected duties, are ultra vires as to the corpora-
tion.4" If the corporate charter itself has expressly
limited the corporation's business activities, then its
misconduct arguably falls outside the "origins"
test for purposes of a tax deduction sought by the
corporation for its legal expenses incurred in de-
fense of the criminal. prosecution brought against
it. Second, corporations may also be held crimi-
nally liable for certain types of misconduct which,
although not necessarily ultra vires, are neverthe-
less speciously business-related. For instance, a
corporation is subject to' criminal penalties for
violations of the political contributions law " and
the campaign disclosure laws. - These criminal laws
relate neither to "business regulations" nor "inher-
ent risks of doing business" even though the corpo-
rate agents may have had the authority to do them. It
is hard to see how these forms of misconduct bear a
sufficiently close connection to the corporation's
ultimate activity of generating gross income in order
to assert that the crime itself has a "business"
origin. The best conclusion is to say that certain
. "International Trading Co. v. Commissibner, 275 F.2d
578, 584 (7th Cir. 1960).
"United States v. Mirror Lake Golf & Country Club,
Inc., 232 F. Supp. 167, 172 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
5018 U.S.C. § 610 (1972). This section applies only to
banks and corporations chartered by Congress.
51 Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(h),
441 (Supp. II, 1972).
2If the corporate donor's political candidate is elected,
he may seek to introduce favorable legislation, which, if
passed, might ultimately enhance the corporate donor's
profits. On the other hand, the political contribution might
also be intended simply as a form of political expression by
the board of directors. Or, it might be calculated to gain a
political advantage for a member of the board of directors or
other corporate officer. But, it is very clear that few, if any,
corporations are in the business of making campaign
contributions.
The notion of using some sort of economic calculator,
i.e., a simple test of whether the criminal activity is intended
to yield a profit, to bring every criminal activity within the
"business origins" parameters has its drawbacks. Suppose
that a corporation wishes to dispose of one of its neighbor-
hood competitors. Instead of attempting to drive it out of
business by employing illegal antitrust tactics, the corporate
crimes fall within a corporation's "personal" under-
takings and hence a deduction for legal expenses
incurred in defense of a criminal prosecution should
be disallowed.
The courts apparently have not adopted this
position, but case law on this issue has been
surprisingly sparce. In Union Investment Co., 53
decided long before Gilmore, the corporate taxpayer
sought to deduct attorney's fees paid out by the
taxpayer for the defense of a corporate officer in a
criminal suit for conspiracy to corrupt legislators in
connection with legislation introduced. The court, in
allowing the deduction, reasoned that the misconduct
involved was proximately and directly connected
with the taxpayer's business since the legislation
sought would have been favorable to its business.
However, since there were three vigorous dissents,
the continuing validity of the decision is
questionable. "
These intellectual stumbling blocks are not con-
fined to corporate activities. "White-collar" crimi-
nals, especially those in an employer-employee
relationship, are also suspect under the foregoing
analysis relating to "business-versus-personal"
misconduct. The expression "white-collar," al-
though originally used by Professor Edwin Suther-
land to designate a class of criminal offenders, " has
also evolved to denote a variety of business-like
crimes:
White-collar criminality in business is expressed most
frequently in the form of misrepresentation on finan-
cial statements of corporations, manipulation in the
stock exchange, commercial bribery, bribery of public
officials directly or indirectly in order to secure
favorable contracts and legislation, misrepresentation
in advertising and salesmanship, embezzlement and
misapplication of funds, short weights and measures
and dishonest grading of commodities, tax frauds, and
misapplication of funds in receiverships and
bankruptcies. 5"
executives decide that arson would be the most effective
means. A secret resolution is passed and then implemented.
The competitor goes out of business. Whether antitrust
tactics or arson is used, the intention is to increase profits.
Assuming that the corporation would be held liable for
arson, can it be said that the arson in this hypothetical case
stands on the same legal footing as a campaign contribution
with respect to its "origin"?
5321 T.C. 659 (1954).
1
4 There are no recent reported cases on this point.
11E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949).
11E. SUTHERLAND, White-Collar Criminality-1940, in
THE SUTHERLAND PAPERS 48 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
E. SUTHERLAND].
These are specific intent crimes where "cheating,
dishonesty or corruption are the central elements," 5'
but they certainly do not exhaust the list of crimes
capable of being committed by individuals ostensibly
acting in a business capacity. One commentator has
distinguished "white-collar crime" from "street
crime," 58 although he offers no criteria to differenti-
ate one kind from the other. Admittedly, corporate or
"white-collar crimes" usually are not regarded in the
same manner as traditional crimes. " For tax pur-
poses, the natural inclination is to draw the line
between "white-collar crime" and "street crime" in
the same place as between "business misconduct"
and "personal misconduct." Consequently, "white-
collar crime" is equated with crimes of business
origins. This makes a minimal amount of sense
because most "white-collar crimes" imply a breach
of trust by the businessman often at the monetary
loss of another, and hence "income" for tax pur-
poses of the tax laws.
However, "white-collar crime" may also be
viewed as a form of theft, a notorious "street crime,"
or "personal misconduct." 60 A careful examination
of the examples listed above reveals at least one
"white-collar crime" which is tantamount to theft:
embezzlement. Embezzlement is a dishonest activity
which produces income, 6 but the crime itself, from
the embezzler's standpoint as an employee perform-
ing services for his employer, attempts to control
non-business endeavors. It is personal misconduct
which occurs in a business setting; it is an unau-
thorized, intentional taking from the business in
contravention of the employee's duties. That em-
bezzlement is included in the list of "white-collar
crimes" suggests that there is an element of "per-
sonal misconduct" involved in the commission of
many, if not all, of the "white-collar crimes," espe-
cially those that are not engaged in for a profit. This
element of personal misconduct, although perhaps
in some instances resulting in financial gain, should
"
7Ogren, The Ineffectiveness of the Criminal Sanction in
Fraud and Corruption Cases: Losing the Battle Against
White-Collar Crime, 11 Ass. CRIM. L. REv. 959 n.1
(1973).
581d. at 960.
59Geis, Criminal Penalties for Corporate Criminals, 8
GRIMI. L. BULL. 377, 384 (1972). For instance, Geis points
to the lenient treatment accorded white-collar criminals in
sentencing.
"
0 A convicted larcenist probably would not impress a tax
court with the argument that he should be allowed to deduct
his legal fees because they were incurred in defense against
a prosecution for a crime arising out of a profit-seeking
activity. But see notes 69-75 and accompanying text infra.
"
1See note 70 and accompanying text infra.
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not be ignored when adjudging whether the crime
has truly "arisen in connection with business ac-
tivities." 62
ADDING CONTENT TO THE "ORIGINS" TEST
In the previous section, an attempt was made to
suggest guidelines for limiting the application of
the "origins" test to crimes which truly have a
business origin. In the course of the discussion,
several existing distinctions of questionable validity
were mentioned, and a few new ones were raised. In
drawing these subtle distinctions and in failing to
draw real ones, the courts have yet to formulate a sat-
isfactory test for determining when a crime "arises
in connection with business or profit-seeking activi-
ties." This society tends to rely on criminal sanc-
tions when other methods of social control fail. 63 As
more and more forms of misconduct are criminalized
and prosecuted, each one will have to be fit into-the
"origins" test if the taxpayer-defendant claims a
deduction for litigation expenses. Therefore, it is
important for the administration of the tax laws
to develop a test for deductions which can handle the
problems in a fair and equitable manner.
A common thread running through many of the
crimes discussed above, such as the Sherman Anti-
trust Act and involuntary manslaughter, is that they
could be expected to arise substantially as a matter of
62This argument can be extended to the more puzzling
situation in which the "white-collar" taxpayer, without an
intent to yield a profit of any kind, commits a crime while
ostensibly in the performance of his delegated duties.
Consider the fate of a taxpayer, a "white-collar" employee
of a union or other not-for-profit organization, whose
principal duties include the gathering of information of
interest to his employer, and whose authority is clothed
with a certain amount of discretion. The taxpayer decides to
exercise his discretionary powers by instructing an agent to
commit a burglary to retrieve information valuable to his
employer. Can the taxpayer deduct the cost of his legal
assistance in a prosecution for burglary as an ordinary and
necessary business expense? The taxpayer's business is that
of rendering services to his employer, and therefore his
business expenses are deductible by him. Folker v. Johnson,
230 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1956); Central Coat, Apron & Linen
Service, Inc. v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). The crime, although not sanctioned by the employer,
was committed by the taxpayer solely in furtherance of his
duties of providing information to his employer. It might
also be argued that the crime was committed in return for
compensation. Thus, it seems that regardless of the ap-
proach, the "origins" test would grant a deduction to this
"white-collar" criminal for a type of personal misconduct.
"
3See, e.g., Mix, The Misdemeanor Approach to Pollu-
tion Control, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 90 (1968); Comment, The
Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Officials for Pollution
of the Environment, 37 ALBANY L. REV. 61 (1972). Both
authors generally favor the use of the criminal sanction to
control air and water pollution.
course during the life of the business. Although the
enforcement of each may vindicate a vastly different
public interest, from the tax point of view they
represent a "cost of doing business." In other words,
certain conduct which leads to criminal liability is
"integral" to carrying on the trade or business. "4 A
crime is not "integral" in the sense that one would
expect the business to commit it, but that when the
crime does occur, it was committed in the regular
course of the business. As a result, a violation of the
antitrust laws has a business origin because its
commission is "integral" to the competitor's busi-
ness activities. The same could probably be said for
the white-collar criminal who runs a crooked busi-
ness. On the other hand, a corporation's illegal
campaign contribution or an illegal attempt to
influence the vote of its employees at a public
election" 5 are hardly integral to the operation of any
trade or business. Also, when a politician illegally
trades a lucrative state construction contract for a few
votes or campaign dollars, one is very reluctant to
concede that that activity is integral to the business of
public service. 66 Nevertheless, the "origins" test
"An "integral" test for use with respect to section
162(a) was suggested by the Seventh Circuit in Allen v.
Commissioner, 283 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1960). Since the case
arose before Gilmore and the test appeared in an entirely
different factual context, it is mentioned here only to
support the terminology employed.
The "integral" test is not meant to supplant the
"origins" test, but only to supplement it where deductions
are sought for legal expenses incurred in defense of a
criminal prosecution.6See Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 194 Wis. 636,217 N.W.
412 (1928). The defendant corporation in Vulcan was
convicted of attempting to influence the votes of its
employees by threatening to discharge them if they voted
contrary to the interests of the company at a referendum
election.
660f course, from the construction company's point of
view, it may very well be integral to its business, but that
does seem to be a cynical position.
The problem of the public official is similar to that of the
union employee who commits a crime in furtherance of his
duties. See note 62 supra. Both are committing "non-busi-
ness regulation" crimes; both seem to be going out of their
way to risk prosecution. In light of these facts, arguably
their misconduct falls outside the "integral" test for
purposes of a tax deduction. Although the union employee
may have been acting within the scope of his authority and
in furtherance of the employer's ends, it does seem that in
choosing to violate the law against burglary to perform his
duties, the union employee acted in a personal capacity and
therefore would not be entitled to a deduction for his legal
expenses. The condemnation of "choosing to violate the
law" occurs here, and not with respect to corporate officials
who conspire to violate the antitrust laws, because of the
nature of the crime involved in the latter situation-direct
business regulation expected to conflict with the business
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alone, which seems to beg the question of "business
misconduct," would probably allow a deduction for
the legal expenses incurred in defense of a charge for
any of these crimes. The "integral" test, to be used as
a standard for determining when a crime "arises in
connection with trade or business or profit-seeking
activities," adds a rational criterion to the "origins"
test.
The superiority of the "integral" test over the
unadorned Glmore test is illustrated in several other
situations. In Sproul v. State Tax Commission 67 the
taxpayer sought a deduction on his state income tax
return for legal expenses incurred in his successful
defense against a murder charge. The taxpayer
owned a farm which had only one outlet to the road.
That outlet consisted of an easement across Wil-
liams' property. When it came time to harvest his
crop and take it to the market, Sproul discovered that
Williams had blocked the right-of-way. Legal threats
failed to remove the blockade, so Sproul, fearing the
loss of his crop if immediate action was not taken,
confronted Williams at the blockade. There was an
altercation, and Sproul killed Williams in self-
defense.
Before the tax commission, Sproul asserted that
the crime charged arose in connection with his
business, and therefore he was entitled to claim the
deduction. The court rejected his argument and
disallowed the deduction but did not rely explicitly
on Gilmore. 68 The court reasoned that although the
crime may technically have arisen in connection with
Sproul's business, his action was so extravagant as to
lose its nexus with his business. A more straightfor-
ward approach would have been to hold that the
homicide was not an "integral" part of his business
of farming. In this unusual case, the "integral" test
would have provided a more satisfying base upon
which the court could have rested its decision than
the "origins" test.
decisions intermittently. This example illustrates the im-
portance of the concept of "business regulation" crimes
under the "integral" test.
67234 Ore. 567, 382 P.2d 99 (1963).
68The state tax law pertaining to trade or business
deductions was worded identically to section 162(a). One
reason that can be offered for the majority's failure to rest
its holding on Gilmore is that Gimore, dealing with
property settlement proceedings, had just been decided, and
the majority may have been uncertain as to its applicability
in the criminal context. Another reason is that since the
decision involved an interpretation of state law, the court
probably did not feel constrained to consider Gilmore as
precedent. The concurring opinion, however, did mention
Gilmore. 234 Ore. at 578, 382 P.2d at 104 (Sloan, J.,
concurring).
It is also not clear how the "origins" test would
resolve a claim for a deduction for legal expenses
incurred in defense of a criminal presecution for
perjury or jury bribery. Suppose that the defendant
in Tellier had given perjurious testimony before a
grand jury investigating his securities activities.
Under the reasoning in Gilmore, Tellier could ar-
gue that the perjury charge had a business origin be-
cause it was derivable from the securities violation.
However, a possible response is that the perjury
charge did not arise from the defendant's business
activities, but rather from his false testimony. The
interest to be vindicated by the second prosecution
relates to a sphere of conduct unrelated to business
activities: appearance before a grand jury. More-
over, the defendant probably testified falsely not
pursuant to any business purpose, but to avoid con-
viction of the substantive crime. Under the "inte-
gral" test, perjury or jury bribery would surely be
ancillary to the operation of any business or profit-
seeking activity and hence would not qualify for a
deduction. Gilmore, which does not contain an
"ancillary" exception, offers no easy solution to
this problem.
One of the most troublesome applications of
Gilmore occurs with respect to traditionally personal
crimes which generate "gross income." It is quite
clear that the Code does not differentiate between
lawful activities and unlawful activities for "gross
income" purposes. 69 In James v. United States, 76 a
prosecution for income tax evasion, embezzled funds
were held includible in gross income. As the Court
stated: "A gain 'constitutes taxable income when its
recipient has such control over it that, as a practical
matter, he derives readily realizable economic value
from it.'" ' 7i So, if all unlawful gains are com-
prehended within the term "gross income," as was
69See notes 70-73 and accompanying text infra. Neither
section 162(a) nor its analogue, section 212, were intended
to be used for moral reform. Senator Williams, in charge of
the income tax sections of the 1913 bill, said of section
162(a)'s predecessor:
The object of this bill is to tax a man's net income;
that is to say, what he has at the end of the year after
deducting from his receipts his expenditures or losses.
It is not to reform men's moral characters; that is not
the object of the bill at all. The tax is not levied for the
purpose of restraining people from betting on horse
races or upon "futures," but the tax is framed for the
purpose of making a man pay upon his net income,
his actual profit during the year. ...
50 CONG. REc. 3849 (1913) (remarks of Senator Williams).
70366 U.S. 213 (1961).
7Id. at 219, quoting Rutkin v. United States, 343
U.S. 130, 137 (1952). Thus, even if the defendant is
required to make restitution of the money, it is still income.
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suggested by James, then any activity generating
those gains must necessarily be characterized as a
form of income-producing activity. Whether the
activity falls within section 162(a)'s "trade or busi-
ness" rubric or section 212's "profit-seeking activ-
ity" rubric simply depends on the amount of time
and energy that the taxpayer-defendant devotes to
the activity. 71 It makes no difference that these are
"prohibited activities" because, except for the spe-
cific exceptions listed in sections 162(c), (f), and (g)
(also read into section 212), these "prohibited activi-
ties" are entitled to otherwise proper deductions for
ordinary and necessary business expenses on par
with legitimate activities. 7 Hence, those activities
generally labelled as elements of "organized crime,"
e.g., gambling, prostitution, racketeering, drug-traf-
ficking, and extortion, logically fall within sections
162 or 212 for deduction purposes.
With regard to a prosecution for the criminal
activity itself, the purpose is apparently to deter the
income-producing activity. This amounts to a very
direct form of business regulation. The crime cannot
be distinguished from the income-producing activity
itself. Therefore, commission of the crime is clearly
"integral" to the carrying on of the illegal business or
profit-seeking activity. Since these activities are
entitled to deductions on par with legitimate enter-
prises, the taxpayer-defendant should be allowed to
take a deduction for criminal legal expenses incurred
in defense of a prosecution for "organized crime."
The court in Glimco v. Commissioner14 recog-
72It is always a matter of degree and will vary from case
to case. See Fischer v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 428
(E.D. Wis. 1971), aff'd, 490 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1973). If
the activity is extensive and amounts to the taxpayer's
livelihood, then it is a trade or business. See note 13 and
accompanying text supra.
7"See note 21 supra.
74397 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1968). Another case with facts
resembling those of Glimco is United States v. Moore,
96 S. Ct. 335 (1975). In Moore, the defendant, a doc-
tor registered under the Controlled Substances Act,
21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970), was convicted of unlaw-
fully distributing methadone in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841 (1970). The doctor unsuccessfully argued that since
he was registered he could not be charged for unlawful
distribution under section 841. The Supreme Court rea-
soned that a registered physician could be prosecuted
for violation of the Controlled Substances Act when his
or her activities fell outside the usual course of professional
practice.
The defendant's tax return was not involved. However,
the distinction drawn by the Court between approved and
unapproved professional practice might be carried over
to the tax arena if the defendant were to claim a deduction
for his attorney's fees. -It is suggested here that such an
analogy would be inappropriate under Gilmore. The doc-
nized this possibility. However, its apparent reluc-
tance to condone such a practice through a literal
reading of the Code inspired it to conclude that the
taxpayer, a union official in the morning, who
extracted money from poultry merchants in the
afternoon, had failed to prove that his afternoon
activities were part of his employment or were done
for the production of income. The court, therefore,
denied the taxpayer a deduction for his legal ex-
penses in defense 'of the extortion charge. The
"origins" test theoretically cannot escape the oppo-
site conclusion except upon a failure of proof as in
Glimco. Of course, defendants charged with profi-
teering through criminal methods will not readily*
admit to the receipt of such income, but once
convicted, there should no longer be a bar to the
deduction of their legal expenses. 7 If the taxpayer-
defendant admits the activity, then income from that
tor was making money regardless of which law he was
violating. Of course, until the case arises, this is all pure
speculation. Nevertheless, Moore does sit at the crossroads
between criminal law and tax law.
"'It would be a curious situation if, for instance, the
defendant were acquitted on state charges of embezzlement
and then sought to deduct the litigation expenses on his
federal tax return. Since the state presumably failed to
prove the existence of the income-producing activity, at least
on that occasion, then perhaps the defendant as taxpayer
could not claim to the contrary on his tax return. Except for
those situations where the state may have lost on a
procedural ground and there would still be evidence of
embezzlement, the result seems paradoxical: the taxpayer
can win only if he loses as a defendant. The problem
revolves around the defendant's proof before the tax court.
Although he need not show that his illegal activity realized
a profit (see note 26 and accompanying text supra) the
taxpayer must show that hecentered the transaction with the
good faith intention of doing so. In the context of criminal
activity as profit-seeking activity, the only acceptable proof
of the requisite intent may be an admission of income. A
possible counterargument is that the criminal charge itself
asserted that the defendant was engaged in a profit-seeking
activity. Since at the time of the expense the outcome was
uncertain, the defendant could treat the expense as one
allegedly arising out of a profit-seeking activity just as the
defendant did in Tellier.
If the income is admitted in the tax court, must it also be
admitted on the federal tax return? Defendants who fear a
federal tax evasion charge more than a state embezzlement
charge may as a consequence run the risk of subjecting
themselves to a.state criminal charge by reporting illegal
income and taking valid deductions. But cf Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). On the other hand, if
the income is not admitted on the federal tax return and
the defendant-taxpayer is charged with criminal income
tax evasion, section 212(3) allows him to deduct his legal
expenses for that defense regardless of the outcome in any of
the other possible suits. Rev. Rul. 68-662, 1968-2 Curt.
BULL. 69.
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activity subject to tax could easily be reduced via the
deduction on the tax return. Nevertheless, it is a
peculiar anomaly in the law that theoretically allows
a professional criminal filing a tax return to deduct
legal expenses and denies the same to a jealous
husband who kills his wife's paramour. The enlight-
ened solution, based on sixth amendment considera-
tions, would be to allow a deduction to both.
A POSSIBLE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Thus far the analysis has been concerned with
developing a rationale, consistent with present tax
theory, for handling the deductions of criminal
defense expenses. The focus will now shift momen-
tarily to an examination of the Gilmore test from a
criminal defendant's perspective. Even a moment's
reflection on the judicial treatment of legal expenses
incurred in defense of a criminal prosecution reveals
some significant inequities.
As Gilmore is presently applied, it results in
disparate treatment for essentially like defendants in
the tax arena. If the taxpayer-defendant has been
charged with a crime arising in a business setting, the
"origins" test assumes that it has arisen out of his
business or profit-seeking activity and all legal
expenses incurred are deductible. No attempt is made
by the courts to establish a nexus between the
commission of the crime and the actual production of
income. On the other hand, for the taxpayer-defend-
ant charged with a crime allegedly arising solely out
of personal misconduct (as opposed to business
misconduct), the legal expenses are not deductible.
But, absent a showing that there is a nexus between
the crime charged and the taxpayer-defendant's
endeavors to produce gross income, all misconduct is
,equally "personal." This inequity is most visible
when it arises with respect to the same crime.
Consider the respective fates of two taxpayer-defend-
ants in the same income tax bracket, each faced with
a criminal prosecution for violating the Rivers and
Harbors Act. 76Taxpayer A, while taking a pleasure
33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970) makes violation of 33 U.S.C. §
407 (1970) a misdemeanor. Section 407 provides:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit,
or cause, suffer, or procure to be thrown, discharged,
or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or
other floating craft of any kind ... any refuse matter
•-• into any navigable water of the United States ....
Sections 407 and 411 also apply to corporations. Although
it has been assumed, arguendo, that a businessman or
corporation would be allowed a deduction for legal expenses
incurred in defense of a prosecution for a violation of section
407, the resolution of that issue is by no means clear. 33
U.S.C. § 1151 (1970) expresses the intent of the pollution
laws which is to enhance the quality of the nation's water
cruise, is charged with dumping refuse matter into a
navigable waterway in violation of section 407.
Taxpayer B, while entertaining business guests on
his yacht, is charged with the same violation.
In the eyes of the tax court, B's conduct neatly
comforms to the requirements of the Code, so B gets
a tax deduction for his legal expenses. A is deprived
of any tax benefit whatsoever. Viewed comparative-
ly, taxpayer A is saddled with a sanction in addition
to the one imposed by the violation itself: increased
financial burden. However, at the criminal trial,
proof of a violation of Rivers and Harbors Act does
not entail a showing of "business misconduct." From
the standpoint of the pollution law's non-business
objective of maintaining the purity of the nation's
water, A and B are treated similarly as due process
and equal protection dictate that they must. It is only
when the criminal activity is placed in the tax law
context of "business" that due process and equal
protection requirements cease to have any meaning
for criminal defendant A. The crucial question is
whether the constitutional protections afforded the
defendant in the criminal law arena can be extended
to the defendant in another legal context.
It is highly unlikely that a tax court would look
favorably upon such an argument on behalf of
taxpayer A. Due process and equal protection attacks
on the Code by taxpayers have generally met with
little success in tax cases. " Criminal defendant-tax-
payers have done no better. In Messina v. United
States"s the taxpayer-defendant had been found
guilty of several sex perversion charges. In appealing
resources. The water pollution laws, then, basically seek to
punish wrongful conduct that bears no intrinsic relationship
to business activities in some circumstances. It has not been
argued thus far that the legislative intent of the criminal law
in question should control the determination of whether the
crime has a business origin. But, if the purpose of the law is
essentially non-business regulation, and applies to individu-
als and corporations alike, then perhaps the legislative
intent should be a relevant factor to be considered under the
"integral" test.
77The typical response to a constitutional attack is that
income tax laws are not unconstitutional under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment, nor are they
unconstitutionally defective because of discriminatory pro-
gressive tax rates. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916). See H. BLACK, INCOME AND OTHER
FEDERAL TAXES 13 (4th ed. 1919); J. HENDERSON,
INTRODUCTION To INCOME TAXATION 47 (2d ed. 1949).
Technically, the equal protection clause applies only to
state action. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329,
337 (1943). However, the equal protection principles are
subsumed in the fifth amendment's due process clause,
applicable to the federal government. Schneider v. Rusk,
377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964).
78202 Ct. Cl. 155 (1973).
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the disallowance of his tax deduction for legal
expenses, Messina offered two constitutional argu-
ments to the court: (1) Since he was not an indigent,
he had to pay his attorney out of after-tax dollars,
thus producing a "gross inequality"; and (2) the
"business-versus-personal" distinction drawn by the
courts and the Code also produced a "gross inequal-
ity." The court rejected both arguments, the first by
saying that a system of taxation which discriminates
on the basis of income is not so wanting a basis for
classification as to produce a gross inequality. " The
court rejected Messina's second argument by holding
that the business-versus-personal distinction con-
fronting the taxpayer does not produce a "gross and
patent inequality" because Congress has chosen to
grant only business deductions and deductions are a
matter of legislative grace. 8" But the court's rejection
of the taxpayer's second constitutional argument
ignores a crucial fact: since Congress has never
mentioned legal fees explicitly, deductions for them
in reality amount to an exercise of "judicial grace."
The degree of "judicial grace" dispensed is solely a
function of the interpretative test employed by the
court in ascertaining deductibility. The court's reply
also overlooks the previously mentioned possibility
that like criminals can be treated unequally depend-
ing upon the economic circumstances surrounding
the commission of the crime, even. though those
economic circumstances may in fact bear no close
relationship to the actual motivation underlying the
commission of the crime. In such a case, the
"business-versus-personal" distinction would col-
lapse.
Although it may not be feasible to make constitu-
tional attacks on the policies underlying the Code,
criminal defendants might be more successful by
emphasizing that the problems occur because of the
courts' insistence on employing the "origins" test
under sections 162 and 212 for criminal defense
expenses. In justification of the present approach, the
court in Nadiak v. Commissioner"' commented: "A
test which makes consequences determinative would
be unwise because it would 'carry us too far' and
result in unequal treatment of like taxpayers."82
Presumably, the court meant that if a "conse-
quences" test were employed, a taxpayer who is
charged with "personal misconduct," a conviction
"Id. at 160-61. No attempt will be made here to
question the constitutionality of progressive tax rates in the
Code.
"
0See note 38 supra.81356 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1966).82Id. at 912.
for which would damage his trade or business or
profit seeking activity, is placed in a more favorable
tax position than is a taxpayer who is charged with
the identical crime but for whom there would be no
adverse business consequences. So, to avoid what it
perceived to be an irrational distinction, the Gilmore
Court with its "origins" test shifted the emphasis to
the other end of the sequence of events. The setting of
the crime became the sine qua non of deductibility
and adverse business consequences became irrele-
vant. Does the "origins" test actually eliminate the
unequal treatment? Assume that a taxpayer-defend-
ant is confronted with a relatively minor criminal
offense arising out of personal misconduct, which
nevertheless could seriously damage his business if it
resulted in a conviction (as in Nadiak). Isn't it more
likely than not that a vigorous and expensive defense
can be best explained by grounding it in a genuine
fear of adverse business consequences rather than a
personal concern for the outcome? Yet, the "origins"
test does not recognize this reasoning and would deny
the deduction. On the other hand, the "origins" test
would allow a deduction for legal expenses incurred
in defense of a criminal prosecution for "personal
misconduct" masquerading as "business miscon-
duct," such as illegal campaign contributions. 83
Moreover, it is arguable that any criminal defense
to a charge of personal misconduct is maintained to
protect a certain kind of property held for the
production of income, namely, one's own person.
The legal consequences of a criminal conviction often
entail the possibility of a prison term. In many cases,
such incarceration is an absolute bar to the produc-
tion or collection of income. Even the conviction (or
in some cases the trial) itself generates enough social
opprobrium to stigmatize the taxpayer in the conduct
of his business. Hence, there certainly are enough
dire business consequences accompanying a criminal
conviction to support the proposition that any crimi-
nal defense for personal misconduct can be domi-
nated by business motives. Theoretically, a crime
with business origins is induced by business motives
and defended for business reasons although no
attempt is ever made in the cases to ascertain the
validity of this proposition. 8 If business motives are
sufficient to make the defense to a business-related
crime an ordinary and necessary business expense,
even those crimes that have been characterized as
non-integral, then why are business motives not
enough for a defense to a "street crime"? 85 If there
8
3See note 66 supra.
8 See notes 48-61 and accompanying text supra.
8 See note 19 supra.
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are inherent business aspects to any criminal defense,
then the solution benefiting all criminal defendants is
to devise a test for deductibility that takes this into
account.
The shortcomings of the "origins" test argue
persuasively for the adoption of a more equitable and
liberal "consequences" test for use in the criminal
sphere. While the "origins" test attempts to catego-
rize crime and therefore has no direct relation to the
actual expense incurred, the "consequences" test
looks to the reason for the expense itself. The latter
seems to be more congruous with tax analysis.
However, the "consequences" test as presently for-
mulated requires a determination that the trial or the
conviction would have actual adverse consequences
on the defendant's trade or business or profit-seeking
activity. Because of the inherent difficulties in prov-
ing such an impact, especially where the crime arises
out of allegedly personal misconduct, it is suggested
that the new rule contain a conclusive presumption of
adverse business consequences to circumvent these
evidentiary problems.8" The practical result is, of
course, a deduction in every instance.
THEORETICAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUP-
PORTING A CHANGE IN THE CODE
If the courts refuse to alter the standard currently
utilized to determine the deductibility of legal ex-
penses for criminal defenses by broadening its scope
to include all criminal defendants, the next alterna-
tive is a revision of the Code. Since the Code forbids
the utilization of the tax laws to frustrate sharply-
defined national or state policies proscribing particu-
lar types of conduct," T the deductibility of legal
expenses incurred in the defense of a criminal
prosecution must not be against public policy. Allow-
ing deductions for legal expenses incurred in defense
of a criminal prosecution, even an unsuccessful one,
can never be against public policy. As the Court said
in Tellier:
8 6There is no compelling reason why the "origins" test
should not be retained for civil litigation. There the
connection between the claim asserted and the business
consequences anticipated may be much more tenuous or
even non-existent.
8 See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356
U.S. 30 (1958). In Tank Truck Rentals, deductions for
fines paid for violations of state law were disallowed on the
basis of public policy. Allowance of the fines would have
meant that the taxpayer could have avoided the sanction
imposed by the law violated. Paying the fine and then
deducting it as a business expense would have become a way
of doing business. The Court refused to authorize such a
practice. This rationale was incorporated into section 162
(f) of the Code. See note 9 supra.
No public policy is offended when a man faced with
serious criminal charges employs a lawyer to help in
his defense. That is not "proscribed conduct." It is his
constitutional right . . . In an adversary system of
criminal justice, it is a basic [sic] of our public policy
that a defendant in a criminal case have counsel to
represent him. "
This reasoning was essentially a refutation of the
non-deductibility position of the Internal Revenue
Service in cases where the defendant had been con-
victed. Before Tellier, the IRS's position was as fol-
lows:
When the business or the activity out of which the
expense grew is illegal or against public policy, the
expense is not ordinary and necessary since it is not
ordinary and certainly not necessary to conduct illegal
activity or to act against public policy; therefore it is
not ordinary and necessary to defend such activity and
therefore legal fees incurred in this defense are
unnecessary. 9
To maintain it is not ordinary or necessary to
defend against illegal activities puts the cart before
the horse. A criminal defendant enters the criminal
adversary system with a presumption of innocence. 9'
That presumption legitimizes any defense and ne-
gates any detrimental effect on public policy. And,
this public policy rationale provides support for any
broadening that might be suggested for deducting
legal expenses. In the absence ofjudicial reformation,
the next problem is finding evidence in the existing
Code to support a general deduction for legal
expenses.
In the past legal expenses have been analogized to
medical expenses.9 1 The provision in the Code
authorizing a personal deduction for medical
expenses, - enacted in 1942, has generally been
88383 U.S. at 694-95.
89Comment, Deductibility of Attorney's Fees Incurred in
Defense of a Criminal Prosecution, 13 STAN. L. REV. 92,
98 (1960).
90Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 471 (1961); cf
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
91Note, A General Practitioner's Guide to the Deducti-
bility of Attorney's Fees, 5 GA. L. REV. 751, 782 (1971);
Note, The Deductibility of Attorney's Fees, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1409, 1428 (1961).
9 Section 213 (a) provides:
There shall be allowed as a deduction the following
amounts, not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise-
(1) the amount by which the amount of the ex-
pense paid during the taxable year (re-
duced by any amount deductible under
graph (2)) for medical care of the tax-
payer, his spouse, and dependents (as de-
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well-received. 93 The emphasis on good health and
society's confidence in medical services has led to the
position that no one should forego medical treatment
because of inadequate financial resources. The pur-
pose of the medical expense deduction is to provide
relief for those medical expenditures thought to be
abnormally large in relation to the taxpayer's
income. "' It is thought that these expenses are often
unpredictable, involuntary, and, on occasion, disas-
trously large.
Legal expenses incurred in defense of a criminal
prosecution can, to a certain extent, be similarly
characterized. For an innocent person wrongfully
accused, the expenses are clearly both unpredictable
and involuntary. For an individual ultimately con-
victed, the presumption of innocence creates an
involuntary aspect to the ordeal, and the amount
expended for legal expenses depends on the length of
the trial and the complexity of the case. Depending
on the nature of the charge, a matter within the
discretion of the prosecutor in many instances, legal
fees can reach an astronomical level and become as
much of a hardship to the taxpayer as any medical
expense. Even for a defendant who merely pleads
guilty to a felony, legal fees still range from $500 to
$1500." Because of the many alternatives available
to civil litigants,96 the factors of unpredictability,
involuntariness, and amount can often be minimized
and consequently justify a difference of treatment for
civil litigation expenses. But, the distinctions be-
tween health and liberty do not seem to be sufficient
to justify the difference in treatment accorded these
two types of expenditures.
Analogizing legal expenses to medical expenses
does expose the former to certain policy objections
levelled at the latter. The medical expense deduction
is sometimes viewed as a hardship provision designed
to relieve the burden on the ill. 9" A "hardship"
fined in section 152) exceeds 3 percent of
the adjusted gross income, and
(2) an amount (not in-excess of $150) equal to
one-half of the expenses paid during the
taxable year for insurance which consti-
tutes medical care for the taxpayer, his
spouse, and dependents.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213 (a).
9 See, e.g., R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
166 (1964).
9 11d. at 165.
"
5Blumberg, Lawyers With Convictions, in THE
SCALES OF JUSTICE 57 (A. Blumberg ed. 1970).
"See note 8 supra.
See 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H.
AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 247 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as SURREY].
provision of this sort does not further any tax policy
and must be contrasted with "tax, hardship" provi-
sions for business activities. 9" A common criticism of
tax deductions in general is that the Code is an
inferior device for implementing extraneous social
objectives such as "personal hardship" provisions
primarily because of the progressive nature of the tax
rates. 99 Whereas the typical social objective is de-
"
9 Id. at 247. "Personal hardship" tax provisions are
generally related to involuntary activities or conditions of
taxpayers such as the extra exemption granted to the aged
or the blind. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 151(c), (d). On
the other hand, "tax hardship" provisions, pertaining
primarily to business activities, include the intangible
drilling expenses deduction for oil and the research and
development expense deduction. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 174.
9 In SURREY, supra note 97, a "tax incentive" is defined
as a tax provision which induces certain activities or behav-
ior in response to the monetary benefit available. SURREY,
supra note 97, at 246. The investment credit for certain
depreciable property is an example. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 38.
Surrey et aL. offer an elaborate criticism of the "tax
expenditure" budget concept in the federal income tax
system. See SURREY, supra note 97, 240-73. According to
the authors, "tax expenditures" include not only exclu-
sions from income, but also deductions, credits, exemp-
tions, deferrals, and preferential rates. Id. at 240. They
argue that these special provisions amount to indirect
government subsidies having no relation to the tax struc-
ture itself.
Surrey et al. begin their criticism of the "tax expendi-
ture" budget concept by exposing some of the mistaken
notions about it. First, while it cannot be denied that there
is little government supervision under such an arrangement,
direct governmental programs could be designed with the
same feature. Second, private decision-making would be no
more advanced by an indirect subsidy than a direct one
because the government could release its monies with no
questions asked.
It is also pointed out that tax incentives permit windfalls
for taxpayers who would have undertaken the activity
anyway. Id. at 261. However, this claim is directed more at
the provisions encouraging certain types of behavior rather
than those designed to relieve personal hardships. It is also
mentioned that the upside-down benefits result from the use
of graduated tax rates.In comparing the relative advantages between "tax
incentives" and direct assistance programs, the authors find
much is lost by employing the "tax incentive" method. The
executive agencies that ordinarily would be responsible for
the accomplishment of the social goal involved are deprived
of any control over the administration or budgeting of the
program because it is supervised by the tax committees in
Congress. Tax committees lack the expertise and insight to
deal effectively with the substantive matters contained in the
social program. The result of this is an unfortunate decrease
in the government's power to control the management of its
priorities. Id. at 266-69.
Surrey et al. further lament that Congressmen seem to
vote irrationally for programs structured as tax provisions
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signed to aid individuals on the basis of some
previously-defined need, an income tax deduction
often benefits the rich at the expense of the not-so-
rich without reference to need. Thus, a deduction of
$100 to an individual in the 50 per cent tax bracket
in effect results in a government subsidy of $50 for
whatever activity is being encouraged (or hardship
relieved), while an individual in the 25 per cent tax
bracket in the same circumstances receives a subsidy
of only $25. If the expense is fairly constant from
bracket to bracket, the deduction aids those least who
need it most. This is especially true if the expenditure
is occasionally very large, as it can be with respect to
medical or legal expenses.
However, the fallacy of the above argument lies in
its assumption that allowing deductions for either
medical or legal expenses would be implementing a
public policy extraneous to the objectives of the Code.
One legal commentator, Professor William An-
drews, "00 has offered a theoretical formulation of an
ideal income tax which argues that the medical
expense deduction is consistent with present income
tax goals. Under Andrews' system tax burdens are
apportioned to the taxpayer's personal consumption
and accumulation of real goods and sdrvices. An-
drews begins his discussion by defining "income" in
terms of how receipts (salary and other forms of
compensation, interest, rents, etc.) are used by the
taxpayer instead of in terms of their source as is
presently done. "' The notions of "consumption"
which they would reject as direct expenditures. Id. at 271.
Moreover, businessmen allegedly respond to tax credits but
not to other forms of government assistance. Id. But,
regardless of the truth of the assertion, the authors believe
that properly publicized direct government assistance pro-
grams could eliminate business suspicion.
From all of this, it is concluded that the best approach to
a new situation is to first explore the various direct
expenditure alternatives.
For a lively debate of Surrey's criticism of the tax
expenditure budget concept see Bittker, Accounting for
Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22
NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969); Surrey & Hellmuth, The Tax
Expenditure Budget-Response to Professor Bittker, 22
NAT'L TAX J. 528 (1969); Bittker, The Tax Expenditure
Budget-A Reply to Professors Surrey & Hellmuth, 22
NAT'L TAX J. 538 (1969).
"'Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income
Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 313 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Andrews].
1 01Id at 313. Under the Code, "gross income" means
all income from whatever source derived. INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 61(a). Andrews' definition is an elaboration of
the one suggested by Henry Simons in H. SIMONS, PER-
SONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). Andrews contends
that his approach is consistent with the intended effect of
of the income tax: to reduce consumption to free money for
public use. Andrews, supra note 100, at 313.
and "accumulation," qualified substitutes for
"spending" and "saving," imply a certain measure
of advancement of material well-being in Andrews'
model. Although the concept of "material well-
being" is somewhat nebulous, it connotes a combina-
tion of "high standard of living" and "financial
security" obtained through'expenditures for ultimate
goods and services. In any event, the result after
tabulating the "consumptions" and "accumulations"
provides an index of relative material well-being
from which tax burdens are to be distributed. The
higher the total, the higher the taxes.
Under Andrews' theoretical construct, however, a
deduction would be allowed for any expenditure
other than for consumption or accumulation. "2
Andrews asserts that a medical expense can be
characterized as an involuntary expenditure, and not
as a type of consumption, because it puts the
taxpayer back to where he should have been. It can
be analogized to a loss of earnings, a setback from
which there is no recovery. Andrews concludes, then,
that above a certain normal level, medical expenses
should be regarded as a reduction of an individual's
freely disposable income (for consumption and accu-
mulation) and hence a reduction in his ability to pay
taxes relative to others with the same initial
potential. 103
The close analogy between medical expenses and
legal expenses incurred in defense of a criminal
prosecution strongly suggests that from Andrews'
theoretical point of view the latter should be treated
like the former in the Code. If the goal is to apportion
tax burdens fairly, i.e., on an ability to pay, then the
granting of a deduction for legal expenses within the
present structure of graduated rates is consistent with
tax policy. Of course, particular legal or medical
expenses are, to a certain extent, a function of
voluntary personal gratification. Consequently, for
taxpayers able to pay regardless of cost, a deduction
for legal expenses would, on occasion, financially
reward personal choice by subsidizing an unneces-
sary expense. If the objective is to grant the deduction
on the basis of need, the question then becomes
whether or not to penalize a taxpayer simply because
he elects to pay more than is required to conduct an
'Andrews, supra note 100, at 325.
...1d. at 336. The taxpayer who misses work due to
illness suffers a loss of earnings. The loss of earnings results
in a reduction of income subject to tax. Similarly, an
individual who incurs medical expenses loses a certain
amount of disposable income, so his taxes are reduced as
well. See also R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
166 (1964).
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adequate criminal defense. But, even if there is a
correlation between the defendant's income tax
bracket and the amount he can and will spend on a
criminal defense, his tax-paying ability will be
reduced. And, it seems that as long as the taxpayer
has a free choice of legal services, the problem of
controlling personal expenditures for legal services
will persist regardless of what general solution is
pursued. Moreover, especially in light of the difficul-
ties in determining the cost of an "adequate defense,"
differences in expenditures could also imply differ-
ences in need. And finally, with respect to legal
expenses, it does seem reasonable to proceed upon
the assumption that a criminal trial is a burden
where heavy costs make every victory a Pyrrhic one,
and, consequently, any difference in result caused by
large expenditure is counterbalanced by the psycho-
logical and financial losses.
A more pragmatic objection to deduction for legal
expenses must be considered. Allowing a deduction
for the cost of defending a criminal prosecution under
the present tax structure might prompt high-income
taxpayers to engage in illegal activities dr to prolong
hopeless defenses because the cost of defense would
be negligible. Of course, such strategies may already
be undertaken with respect to crimes qualifying
under Gilmore. But, what possible benefit could
there be to the taxpayer in a situation where one's
liberty or property must be jeopardized in order to
claim a tax deduction? Likewise, indigents who
commit crimes are probably no more inclined to do so
because legal representation subsequent to the arrest
will be free. "04
However, even to the extent that this is a realistic
assumption, the separate issue remains whether to
permit the additional sanction of non-deductibility of
legal fees regardless of the tax bracket of the
individual or the nature of the crime. The imperfec-
tions in the administration of the criminal justice
system should not influence an attitude toward tax
law reform to comport with the goals of the system.
Since statistical evidence is unavailable, one can only
speculate as to the number of taxpayer-defendants of
modest means who have been discouraged or pre-
vented from effectively defending against prosecu-
tions arising out of personal misconduct because of
the anticipated prohibitive costs. 05 To allow an
"' But cf. Oaks & Lehman, The Criminal Process of
Cook County and the Indigent Defendant, 1966 U. ILL. L.
F. 584, 714-15. Free legal services may increase the
number of appeals which are filed.
50Other prohibitive costs may also interfere with the
proper functioning of the criminal process. In former
extraneous factor such as cost to influence the
functioning of the administration of the criminal
justice system prevents the accomplishment of the
goals of the system. The prosecution, defendant, and
society may lose the benefit of a complete trial, so a
full disclosure of the truth is never made. 5o5
A NEw PROPOSAL
It has been seen that an across-the-board tax
deduction for legal expenses incurred in the defense
of a criminal prosecution would be consistent with
both public policy and tax policy. 107 While this
conclusion follows from the premises advanced
above, it overlooks the fact that still not everyone
similarly situated would be treated equally under a
liberal expansion of the present tax deduction struc-
ture. This comment was originally concerned with
the disparate treatment accorded like criminal de-
fendants in any tax bracket when they are in the role
of a taxpayer.' The focus then shifted to the plight
of criminal defendants in a like tax bracket with
non-criminal taxpayers. 109 Now, if equality among
all criminal defendants with respect to criminal
defense expenses, regardless of the defendant-taxpay-
er's income tax bracket, is the goal, then a simple
provision for a uniform flat-rate deduction would be
inadequate to achieve that goal. If "equality among
criminal defendants" is tantamount to the ultimate
social objective of providing effective counsel for all
criminal defendants, it could only be attained if free
and unlimited access to the most competent legal
counsel were made available to each criminal defend-
ant. This ideal is unattainable unless a "socialized
bar" is preferred, because so long as the market
forces control supply and demand of legal services the
wealthy will be able to capture the market and
Vice-President Agnew's television and radio address to the
nation, he declared that one of the reasons he declined to
"fight for the integrity of his office whatever the cost"
following his indictment for federal income tax evasion was
to "spare [his] family a great anguish." N.Y. Times,
Oct. 16, 1973, § 1, at 34, col. 1 (city ed.). Psychological
and financial barriers present serious impediments to an
effective defense to a criminal prosecution and should be
assuaged.
1 6Several Supreme Court decisions have recognized that
the "pursuit of truth" is one of the primary goals of a
criminal trial. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
454 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring); Tehan v. United
States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
"'
7See notes 87-106 and accompanying text supra.
"'
0See text accompanying notes 38-86 supra.
109See text accompanying notes 87-106 supra.
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monopolize the private criminal legal services.110
Less ambitious proposals will be considered.
One alternative is to have the federal or state
governments provide direct funding for defenses of
criminal prosecutions. " If incorporated into the
present structure of public defender programs, 12 a
substantial increase in the number and salaries of
public defenders, coupled with giving more individu-
als access to them, would greatly ease the financial
burden on many. criminal defendants. But, the
coveted element of choice of private counsel would be
lost. So, the government could also provide a direct
subsidy to privately retained counsel. However, both
of these suggestions necessitate a more visibly expan-
sive role by the government in private affairs, a polit-
ical strategem in disfavor in contemporary times.
A second alternative is the pre-paid legal service
program. "' Experiments with pre-paid legal service
programs have suggested that there is a substantial
unfulfilled need among individuals of moderate
rheans for general legal services, 14 but there is also
criticism that there is no empirical data to support
this conclusion. 115 While utilization of legal services
has increased somewhat under experimental pro-
grams, it is thought that participants may be reluc-
tant to pay for legal services that they have not been
induced to use or feel they do not need. "'0 Typical
pre-paid legal services plans reflect this reluctance
because they generally do not provide for coverage in
case of catastrophic expenses like the legal fees
expended in defense of a serious felony charge. 17 In
"'As one commentator has mentioned, there is a major
obstacle: the legal profession has never really directed its
attentions to the working man and his criminal
problems-it caters to business and property interests.
Greene, Prepaid Legal Services: More Than an Open and
Closed Case, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 425, 431 (1973).
'1This approach would be favored by Surrey. See note
99 supra.
"
2The federal defender program was established by the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, now 18 U.S.C. § 3006A
(1970). For comparable state programs see, e.g., CAL.
GOV'T CODE § § 27700 et seq. (West 1968); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 34, § § 5601 et seq. (1975); N.Y. COUNTY LAW
§ § 716 et seq. (McKinney 1972).
"'
5A "pre-paid legal service" is one in which payments
are made in advance for the use of legal services in the
future. They are generally administered by an organization
and operated for the benefit of its members.
"'See F. MARKS, THE SHREVEPORT PLAN 36 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as F. MARKS]. The experiment showed
that only 54 per cent of the participants had ever been to a
lawyer before.
115 Greene, supra note 110, at 430.
111B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODER-
ATE MEANS 67-69 (1970) [hereinafter cited as B.
CHRISTENSEN].117The Shreveport Plan provided for a total of $1665 per
fact, very few pre-paid legal service programs pro-
vide for comprehensive coverage. 1 The last, and
perhaps the most crippling criticism of pre-paid legal
services programs as they are presently designed, is
that they are fraught with legal problems. 11
This reluctance on the part of an individual to pay
for something that he does not think he needs or
would not use hampers the development of commer-
cially-sponsored legal insurance also. Most people
probably would not insure themselves against the
risk of a serious criminal charge because of the slight
possibility of one ever being brought against them. "0
It is this refusal to hedge against legal expenses
generally, and criminal legal expenses specifically,
that have impeded insurance companies-there sim-
ply are not enough major legal expenses to make a
legal insurance package marketable. 121 The point is
that if the public is relatively indifferent toward using
legal services or for paying for something that it
thinks happens (and probably does happen most of
the time) only to someone else, then it does not seem
to be economically or politically feasible to ask the
general public to share the burden of paying for
someone else's legal fees beyond what is constitution-
ally required.
Although a tax expenditure program may be an
inferior and piecemeal way of attempting to equalize
and ease the financial burden on criminal defendants,
it may be the only feasible method available at the
present. 122 In drafting a new provision for the Code,
care must be exercised to avoid the pitfalls that have
plagued other deduction sections of the Code and
subjected them to much criticism. 22 The structure
must reflect and satisfy the needs of every taxpayer
regardless of his income level. Admittedly, individu-
als without income tax liability will not benefit from
year in coverage for each member. The plan paid 80 per
cent on the next one thousand dollars. Beyond that the
participant shouldered the entire load. F. MARKS, supra
note 114, at 8.
118See Murphy, Buy Now-Receive Later: A Vision of
the Future, 11 TRIAL 12, 13,(1975) [hereinafter cited as
Murphy]. Of the several thousand group plans presently in
operation, only fifteen offer substantial legal benefits paid
for in full.
11 There are significant ethical considerations, antitrust
laws, insurance regulations, and income tax laws blocking
the pathway to experimentation. Id. at 15-17.
120B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 116, at 67.
1.1 In a similar vein, another commentator states: "No
plans [for pre-paid legal services] are now offered to in-
dividuals in the general public." Murphy, supra note
118, at 13.
2
'One must depend on Congress to enact something
indirectly that they probably would not enact directly. See
note 99 supra.
...See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
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any personal deduction provision. But, for the
bottom ,20 per cent of the income scale, there are the
various federal and state defender programs. 12 Since
the most affluent 10 per cent of the citizens of this
country have never had any difficulty in supplying
themselves with legal services, the primary concern
must lie with the middle 70 per cent.
The most enlightened amendment to the Code
would entail a tax credit, such as the existing
investment tax credit, instead of the more indirect
deduction. 125 A tax credit provides for a dollar for
dollar reduction from tax liability, while a deduction
is tied to the income level. The credit must be large
enough to make it valuable regardless of the level of
the expenditure. Alternatively, a personal deduction
provision could be designed with a diminishing rate
structure, probably best conceptualized as an in-
verted pyramid. However, since the goal is to provide
protection for all taxpayers, the taxpayers in the
higher income levels must be given a deduction
equal to what they would have gotten under the
present calculations. It is admitted that neither
proposal would cure all the defects in the present
system, but either would significantly reduce some of
the existing inequities.
One broad objection to this proposal would be that
the inequities being combatted are more theoretical
than real. It is true that any change will have only a
minimal effect on corporations because Gilmore has
been giving them a tax deduction all along, even
when perhaps unjustified. But, society has been
conditioned to believe that individuals in the middle
income brackets, usually Sutherland's white-collar
workers, commit little crime. 12 When they do
commit crime, the mythology claims that the crimes
are "white-collar crime" of a "business origin"
"
24See note 112 supra. Public defender programs have
not escaped criticism. See, e.g., Oaks & Lehman, The
Criminal Process of Cook County and the Indigent Defend-
ant, 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 584.12 5See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 38. This section
provides for a tax credit of 7 per cent on certain depreciable
property used in a trade or business.
2
'Sutherland designated the persons of high socioeco-
nomic status, those who were "respected" or "socially
accepted and approved," as "white-collar" workers. See E.
SUTHERLAND, supra note 56, at 51 n.l. There is little
empirical data on the proclivity of white-collar individuals
toward crime, or the system's response to the white-collar
criminal. One study revealed the following information:
It is interesting that "white-collar" criminals do not
appear to have the extensive immunity to prosecution
that sociologists have believed. During 1964 the
probation division [of the group of courts studied]
investigated 3,643 persons; of these approximately 8
per cent, by virtue of their education, occupation,
income, and nature of their offense, would qualify as
anyway, so the allegedly forsaken middle-income
taxpayer-defendants have been getting a tax deduc-
tion for legal expenses all along. This contention is
vigorously disputed, but it is admitted that there is
also no evidence to support the contrary position. 127
It does seem that individuals in the middle and upper
income brackets commit "street crimes," or are at
least accused of them-"street crimes" are not
reserved for the bottom 20 per cent. If they commit
them in significant proportions, then consideration of
their plight is warranted. But, even if it happens
rarely, the sixth amendment suggests that some
mechanism should be developed to assure that there
is an effective right to counsel for every criminal
defendant. 128
CONCLUSION
This comment has presented a broad survey of the
law pertaining to tax deductions for legal expenses
incurred in defense of a criminal prosecution. It waS
"white-collar" criminals. While these offenders might
ultimately have fared better by plea or sentence, they
could not by virtue of a more favorable social position
overcome the organizational mechanism of the court
entirely-contrary to a rather shopworn notion
among criminologists. In addition, the probation
division collected more than S250,000 in restitution
money during that year, a substantial amount of that
sum being amounts returned to their victims by
"white-collar" offenders.
A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 40-41 (1967). Of course,
this excerpt reflects a mixing of white-collar criminals who
committed some form of business misconduct with those
who committed some form of personal misconduct. Hence,
it is impossible to determine what portion of the 8 per cent
could have taken a deduction for their legal expenses. But,
the study does show that individuals who must pay for the
services of a lawyer out of after-tax dollars are being
prosecuted.
.
2 Inquiries to the American Judicature Society, Ameri-
can Bar Foundation, Law Enforcement Assistance Admin-
istration, and National District Attorney's Association
received the same response: nobody collects demographic
information pertaining to socioeconomic status of criminal
offenders.
Approaching the problem from another angle does
produce some results. In an empirical study of the effective-
ness of privately-retained counsel versus public defenders,
Dallin Oaks and Warren Lehman examined the type of
representation employed by criminal defendants in all
felony cases in Cook County, Illinois, in 1964. Oaks &
Lehman, Lawyers for the Poor, in THE SCALES OF
JUSTICE 92 (A. Blumberg ed. 1970). Of the 5,579 indict-
ments, 3,140 or 56 per cent were defended by privately-
retained attorneys. Of this group 95 per cent were paid by
their clients. Id. Although it is impossible to determine
what portion of this 56 per cent would benefit from a tax
credit, further investigation does seem to be in order.
12 A person accused of a crime, regardless of his
financial station in society, is entitled to effective counsel at
trial. Santellan v. Beto, 371 F. Supp. 194, 197-98 (S. D.
Tex. 1974).
seen that a taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for his
legal expenses paid out in defense against a criminal
charge only if the crime arose in connection with
taxpayer's trade or business or profit-seeking activ-
ity. However, the vagueness of the "origins" test in
the criminal context makes its application uncertain
to many types of crimes. And, because the applica-
tion occurs on a tax return, rarely reviewed by
anyone beyond the Internal Revenue Service, its
uncertainty is even more pronounced. But, it does
seem implicit from the few cases available for study
that there is a tendency by the courts to be generous
with corporations and white-collar taxpayers. It was
argued that this generosity is unjustified in those
instances where corporations or white-collar busi-
nessmen engage in illegal personal undertakings
under the guise of business conduct. It was also
suggested that perhaps the courts and the IRS are too
demanding of taxpayers charged with crimes arising
from profit-seeking activities. To remedy this uneven
treatment, an "integral" test for determining the
"origin" of a crime was proposed. The "integral"
test looks to the purpose of the crime and the inherent
risk it creates for the taxpayer in the operation of his
trade or business or profit-seeking activity: Under it,
a corporation's deduction for legal expenses incurred
in defense of a criminal charge for an illegal political
contribution would be disallowed; that of a taxpayer
tried for extortion would be allowed.
The focus of the comment then shifted to an
external examination of the tax deduction policy
from the criminal defendant's perspective, particu-
larly that of the individual charged with a so-called
"crime of personal misconduct." In furtherance of
equitable treatment of criminal defendants, a judicial
revamping of the existing rules for tax deductions for
criminal legal expenses was called for. It was noted
that criminal defendants, facing identical criminal
charges, would face dissimilar tax consequences
depending on the economic setting of the crime.
Finding that somewhat disturbing, it was then
demonstrated that the "business-versus-personal"
distinction is highly artificial in the criminal context;
there are personal aspects to a business-related
crime, but business aspects to probably all criminal
defenses. Recognizing the inherent business aspects
to a criminal defense, i.e., avoidance of adverse
business consequences if convicted, a "consequences"
test ultimately allowing an across-the-board deduc-
tion was proposed.
Conceding that adoption of a new judicial test is
unlikely, a solution for the plight of the criminal
defendant saddled with heavy legal expenses was
sought in an amendment to the Code itself. Two
suggestions were advanced. The first, consistent with
present tax policy and public policy, argued for the
passage of a legal expenses deduction analogous to
the existing medical expenses deduction. The second,
extension of the first adding sixth amendment policy
considerations, argued for a tax credit or similar
provision for criminal legal expenses. The latter is
preferred as a better implementation of the basic goal
of relieving the financial burden confronting every
criminal defendant. However, not until criminal
defendants are treated in a uniform manner can it
truly be said that due process is applied in practice,
and that the right to effective counsel is within
everyone's grasp.
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